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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SHIFT TOWARD  
AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN ELECTION LAW 
Joshua A. Douglas* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Election law is experiencing immense change. The Supreme 
Court’s recent approach to election law cases has significant 
implications for the scope of the right to vote and the meaning of 
political participation and self-governance. This Article examines the 
importance of the Court’s recent pronouncement that plaintiffs can bring 
election law challenges only as applied to a particular political actor for 
a particular situation, instead of challenging a law in its entirety.1 The 
“as-applied only” rule may seem like simply a procedural method for 
construing election laws or a mere semantic distinction, but, as I show, 
in reality the Court’s decisions have significant substantive 
ramifications. 
Shortly before the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Crawford v. 
Marion County Election Board,2 upholding the right of states to require 
that voters show a photo identification to vote, noted election law 
scholar Professor Rick Hasen warned of the perils of a ruling that 
narrowed the scope of election law litigation solely to as-applied 
challenges.3 He explained that such an approach would make those laws 
                                                          
 * Law Clerk to the Honorable Edward C. Prado, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit. Special thanks to David Fontana, Rick Hasen, Stefanie Lindquist, Donne Marchetto, 
Joseph R. Oliveri, and Michael J. Pitts for advice on drafts of this Article. Thanks also to Drew 
Gulley and the staff of the Hofstra Law Review for their invaluable editing assistance. 
 1. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193-95 
(2008).  
 2. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1615 (2008). 
 3. Rick L. Hasen, About Face: The Roberts Court Sets the Stage for Shrinking Voting Rights, 
Putting Poor and Minority Voters Especially in Danger, FINDLAW’S WRIT, Mar. 26, 2008, 
http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/commentary/20080326_hasen.html; see also Tony Mauro, Supreme 
Court Upholds Indiana Voter ID Law Just Before Primary, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 29, 2008, available 
at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1209373541997 (“Hasen adds that if laws like Indiana’s 
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“no longer . . . subject to facial challenges. That means, in turn, that the 
laws will have to be in effect for a while before they are challenged, and 
that they will cause damage in the interim, at a minimum.”4 He also 
posited that this approach would have an adverse effect on poor and 
minority voters.5 
This Article seeks to determine if the Court’s recent rulings in 
Crawford and Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party6 had, in the short term, a detrimental effect on voters’ rights. Was 
it more difficult for voters during the 2008 election cycle to vindicate 
their rights because the Supreme Court boldly stated that plaintiffs may 
bring election law challenges only as applied? Have judges now 
conferred on states an almost unfettered ability to regulate their 
elections, to the detriment of voters, advocacy groups, candidates, and 
political parties? Is there a better approach to election law that can 
replace the facial or as-applied dichotomy? 
To discern whether these two significant election law cases in the 
2007 Term had an effect on subsequent challenges to election 
regulations, I analyze federal election law decisions from both 2004 and 
2008. If the Court’s pronouncements in Washington State Grange and 
Crawford had an immediate impact on the landscape of election law 
litigation, then we would expect to see lower federal courts in 2008 more 
easily rejecting broad constitutional challenges to election laws because, 
even if the law might be unconstitutional in another setting, it is valid as 
applied to that particular political actor. Further, when plaintiffs win an 
election law case, the relief will likely be narrow in scope. 
Washington State Grange and Crawford may have impacted federal 
court decisions in two ways: First, there could be a direct impact, 
whereby courts cite the cases for the proposition that only as-applied 
challenges are appropriate. Second, there could be an indirect impact, in 
that federal courts portend an overall wariness to issue broad decisions 
striking down election regulations. Of course, we will need several more 
election cycles to fully understand the ultimate effect of these cases. For 
now, my research shows that these cases had a slight but noticeable 
immediate impact and that the Court’s pronouncements have altered the 
way in which federal courts analyze election law cases. These decisions 
do not represent a sea change in the law but instead foretell a more 
                                                          
must now be challenged ‘as applied,’ that is ‘going to make it tough for a lot of plaintiffs who are 
burdened’ to make their case.”). 
 4. Hasen, supra note 3.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195. 
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nuanced approach that gives states wider leeway in regulating their 
election processes. 
Uncovering the effect of the Court’s focus on as-applied challenges 
helps to measure the underlying value of the right to vote.7 This 
conclusion reinforces the premise that the right to vote is a judge-made 
right and that the scope of that right generally depends on the individual 
judges deciding these cases. Of course, at a basic level, we all know that 
judges decide close election law disputes—the 2000 presidential election 
and the 2008 Minnesota Senate recount provide high-profile examples of 
this proposition.8 What is less obvious is that judges have tremendous 
power in shaping the right to vote for the operation of everyday 
elections. 
In the 1960s, Supreme Court Justices conferred a high value on the 
right to vote and sought to protect the right against state encroachment, 
often by striking down election regulations on their face.9 Judges used 
facial challenges to effectuate widespread changes in how states 
regulated their elections, with the upshot being greater protection for 
individual voters. Today, judges are narrowing the scope of the 
individual right to vote through the use of decisions that construe 
election laws only as applied to those who bring suit; Washington State 
Grange and Crawford were the catalysts for the current zenith in that 
trend.10 The as-applied rule from Washington State Grange and 
Crawford has allowed federal judges to swing the pendulum toward 
favoring government regulation at the expense of political actors, such 
as voters. This Article therefore reinforces the idea that seemingly 
routine judicial rules—such as a preference for facial or as-applied 
challenges—play an important role in shaping the right to vote. 
                                                          
 7. See generally Nathaniel Persily, Fig Leaves and Tea Leaves in the Supreme Court’s 
Recent Election Law Decisions, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 89 (2009) (discussing the underlying messages 
in the Court’s recent election law cases as they impact the public sphere); Nathaniel Persily & 
Jennifer Rosenberg, Defacing Democracy? The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-
Applied Challenges in the Supreme Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 
(2009) (examining the implications of the distinction between as-applied and facial challenges in 
election law).  
 8. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (halting the recall effort in Florida and effectively 
deciding the disputed election between the presidential candidates); John Schwartz, Minnesota 
Justices Are Skeptical in Senate Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2009, at A10. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court handed down its decision in the dispute between Norm Coleman and Al Franken shortly 
before the printing of this Article. See Sheehan v. Franken, No. A09-697 (Minn. June 30, 2009) (per 
curiam),http://www.mncourts.gov/opinions/sc/current/OPA090697-6030.pdf. 
 9. See infra Part II.B. 
 10. See infra Part II.C. 
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Ultimately, this analysis provides a cogent explanation of how judges 
define the meaning of political participation.11  
The following discussion explains the pitfalls of the Court’s current 
focus on as-applied challenges for election law cases. Facial challenges 
are better than as-applied challenges at vindicating the rights of many 
voters at once. Without facial challenges, a law might be in force in 
perpetuity even though its application to a certain set of voters is 
unconstitutional, because no one has brought a successful as-applied suit 
to challenge that application of the law. In the process, not only do some 
voters suffer an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote, but there 
can also be a chilling effect on voters’ political participation. 
However, the Court has also provided cogent reasons for why facial 
challenges to all election laws are inappropriate, such as the desire to 
avoid constitutional questions and protect legislative prerogatives.12 
Therefore, I conclude that the Court should abolish the “as-applied only” 
rule and instead adopt an approach more favorable to the ideals of 
protecting voters’ rights and providing clarity, but less onerous than a 
rule that requires courts to uphold or strike down a law on its face in all 
instances: the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. This middle 
ground allows courts to vindicate the rights of voters who suffer an 
unconstitutional burden without impinging too much on the rights of 
states to regulate their elections. It requires courts to sever an 
unconstitutional application of an election law even if the law is valid as 
applied to the voter who brought suit, thereby saving most of the law but 
excising the unconstitutional portion. 
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Following this introduction in 
Part I, Part II discusses the history of election law litigation in terms of 
facial versus as-applied challenges. Part III analyzes federal court of 
appeals, district court, and state court cases that have cited Washington 
State Grange and Crawford and aggregates election law decisions 
during 2004 and 2008 to determine the effects of the Supreme Court’s 
recent pronouncement that election law challenges should only be as 
applied. Part IV explains the importance and implications of judicial 
rules such as these in the democratic process. Finally, Part V argues that 
the Court should eliminate the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges in its election law jurisprudence and adopt, as a middle 
ground, the overbreadth doctrine in its place. 
                                                          
 11. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in 
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 722-30 (1994). 
 12. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.  
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II. THE SHIFT FROM FACIAL TO AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN 
ELECTION LAW 
When the Supreme Court entered the business of deciding the 
constitutionality of election regulations, it typically did so through the 
lens of facial challenges. Only recently has the Court backed away from 
striking down election laws on their face, instead preferring the 
piecemeal approach of as-applied litigation. Lower courts have followed 
suit. This Part explores that shift. 
A. Facial Versus As-Applied Challenges 
Whether a court considers the constitutionality of a statute under a 
facial or as-applied approach is crucial both to the method of 
jurisprudence and to the ultimate outcome.13 Facial challenges present a 
completely different path from as-applied challenges; whereas a facial 
challenge asks whether a statute is constitutional in all of its 
applications, in an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff must show only 
that the law is invalid in that particular situation.14 Each method of 
examining a statute has distinct interpretative rules and, therefore, 
different implications for constitutional jurisprudence.15 Of course, the 
terms “facial” and “as-applied” are less than precise, and courts and 
scholars have struggled to clearly define the two approaches.16 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has recently attempted to distinguish 
the doctrines, particularly in election law cases, so it is important to 
                                                          
 13. See David H. Gans, Strategic Facial Challenges, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2005) 
(“Few areas of law more sharply present the issue of the Court’s role in implementing the 
Constitution than the law governing facial and as-applied challenges to statutes.”). 
 14. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 
235, 236 (1994). Professor Richard Fallon disagrees with this dichotomy, suggesting that “there is 
no single distinctive category of facial, as opposed to as-applied, litigation.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
As-Applied and Facial Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1324 
(2000). Fallon notes that although a litigant “must always assert that the statute’s application to her 
case violates the Constitution” the deciding court “will typically apply a general norm or test and, in 
doing so, may engage in reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality.” Id. at 
1327-28. Professor Matthew Adler takes a different view, arguing that all challenges to statutes are, 
at their core, facial challenges. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of 
American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 157-58 (1998). My analysis reveals that the 
Court’s election law jurisprudence has carved out a stark distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges. 
 15. The doctrines also create much confusion for courts and scholars. See Edward A. Hartnett, 
Modest Hope for a Modest Roberts Court: Deference, Facial Challenges, and the Comparative 
Competence of Courts, 59 SMU L. REV. 1735, 1748 (2006) (“Supreme Court jurisprudence is in 
disarray concerning facial and as-applied challenges to the constitutionality of statutes.”). 
 16. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 14, at 157-58; Dorf, supra note 14, at 239-42; Fallon, supra 
note 14, at 1327-28; Gans, supra note 13, at 1339-41. 
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begin with a discussion of the differences between these methods of 
constitutional adjudication. 
1. Facial Challenges 
Facial challenges allow courts to vindicate the rights of many in 
one fell swoop. The starting place for understanding how the Supreme 
Court analyzes a plaintiff’s request to strike down a law in its entirety is 
the Court’s 1987 decision in United States v. Salerno.17 In that case, two 
criminal defendants challenged the Bail Reform Act’s18 pretrial 
detention provisions, asserting that the law violated due process by 
allowing the government to detain defendants based on a finding of 
future dangerousness.19 The Court noted that “[a] facial challenge to a 
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount 
successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.”20 In essence, 
the Court required the criminal defendants to show that the law would be 
unconstitutional in every single conceivable application.21 
Several commentators have noted that in analyzing a facial 
challenge, a court interprets the law in the abstract, devoid of context in 
the application of the law to the real world.22 As Professor Massey notes, 
“courts are incapable of assessing effects in facial challenges cases 
because there are no effects to be observed.”23 Thus, “there is room for 
courts to treat facial challenges as a form of constitutional 
prophylaxis.”24 Simply put, the Court asks itself whether the government 
may enforce the law in question against any person and in any situation. 
If there is a conceivable way in which to enforce the law, then the Court 
will reject the facial challenge. 
The Court’s general rejection of facial challenges has several 
implications for challenging a statute. First, plaintiffs typically have a 
harder time winning their case. They must show that the statute, beyond 
the application to them, is unconstitutional. Second, states may innovate 
in the way they use their police powers without worrying that a court 
                                                          
 17. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 18. Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3141-50 (2006)). 
 19. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743-44. 
 20. Id. at 745. 
 21. See Gans, supra note 13, at 1335-36. 
 22. Id. at 1337; Calvin Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial 
Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1, 54 (2007). 
 23. Massey, supra note 22, at 54. 
 24. Id. 
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will strike down all applications of a given law. In Sabri v. United 
States,25 the Court chastised the petitioner for his strategy of bringing a 
facial challenge, stating that “facial challenges are best when 
infrequent.”26 The Court noted that although invalidating a law on its 
face might be “efficient in the abstract,” any gain would be offset by 
“losing the lessons taught by the particular.”27 When a court invalidates 
an entire law on its face, states have a harder time learning which 
applications are permissible versus impermissible. Third, rejecting facial 
challenges allows the Court to avoid making sweeping decisions that 
alter the landscape of how a state implements a statute or encroaching 
upon legislative prerogatives, thereby adhering to the doctrines of 
separation of powers and constitutional avoidance.28 Based on these 
doctrines, the Court can uphold most laws and avoid a difficult analysis 
of the law’s constitutionality in various other settings. It is a lot easier to 
reject a facial challenge and opine that a law might be unconstitutional in 
a different, abstract setting than to provide clear answers on when 
exactly a state can enforce the law. In sum, the Court generally prefers a 
slow method of constitutional adjudication, in which it can consider 
solely the application of a statute to particular situations. 
2. As-Applied Challenges 
In an as-applied challenge, the plaintiff need only demonstrate that 
the law is invalid when applied to that particular plaintiff.29 That is, a 
state still can enforce the statute against most people, even if a court 
strikes down certain applications of the law.30 In this mode of 
constitutional adjudication, a statute receives more deliberate 
examination, whereby it can be applied in various settings—most 
constitutional, but perhaps some unconstitutional. Importantly, the 
plaintiff must challenge the application of the law to him- or herself, not 
to a third party. “Under the as-applied model, courts implement 
constitutional norms on a slower, more gradual basis.”31 
                                                          
 25. 541 U.S. 600 (2004). 
 26. Id. at 608. 
 27. Id. at 609. 
 28. See Persily, supra note 7, at 94; see also Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008). 
 29. See Marc E. Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule 
Requirement, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 359, 424-25 (1998). 
 30. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial Challenges and Federalism, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 881 
(2005) (noting that “a successful as-applied challenge still allows the state to ‘enforce the statute in 
different circumstances’” (quoting Dorf, supra note 14, at 236)). 
 31. Gans, supra note 13, at 1335. 
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As-applied challenges present significant hurdles for the 
vindication of individual rights. In particular, the results of as-applied 
challenges are gradual, with an individualistic focus. Change comes 
slowly through an as-applied lawsuit because the court considers only 
whether the statute violates the plaintiff’s rights in that particular 
instance, instead of more broadly. As one commentator noted, there are 
considerable costs to as-applied jurisprudence: “Its gradualism and more 
individualistic focus may, in certain circumstances, make more difficult 
the enforcement of constitutional rights.”32 Thus, if a court holds a 
particular statute unconstitutional as-applied, the government still may 
enforce that statute in a different circumstance.33 
B. Facial Challenges in Election Law 
The Warren Court of the 1960s brought about a significant growth 
in rights vindication in election law. Throughout the decade, the 
Supreme Court persisted in striking down election regulations that 
deprived individuals of their constitutional right to vote.34 Importantly, 
the Court did not provide protection on a case-by-case basis, solely 
invalidating particular applications of laws for certain individuals. 
Instead, the Court struck down numerous laws in their entirety that made 
explicit distinctions on who enjoyed the benefits of the franchise.35 Thus, 
the Court did not widely defer to the states to determine who could vote 
or wait to see the actual effects of an election regulation, but instead 
struck down various laws on their face. An analysis of these cases 
reveals that the Court used the vehicle of facial challenges to usher in 
widespread election reform in quick fashion. 
For example, several states sought to limit the eligible electorate in 
certain elections to those who the state determined actually had a 
particularized vested interest in the outcome.36 Consider Cipriano v. City 
of Houma, in which the Court analyzed a Louisiana law that gave only 
                                                          
 32. Id. at 1336 (discussing the “costs of case-by-case adjudication”). 
 33. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 236. 
 34. See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) (per curiam); Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1969); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 
533-34 (1965).  
 35. See, e.g., Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706; Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33; Harman, 380 U.S. at 
533-34. 
 36. See, e.g., Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706 (striking down a Louisiana law that gave only 
“property taxpayers” the right to vote in elections regarding a municipal utility’s issuance of 
revenue bonds); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632-33 (invalidating a law that prohibited otherwise eligible 
people from participating in district meetings and local school board elections). 
  
2009] AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES IN ELECTION LAW 643 
“property owners” the right to vote in certain elections.37 The Court held 
that the state had not met its burden of justifying the law, particularly 
given the “‘exacting standard of precision we require of statutes which 
selectively distribute the franchise.’”38 The Court required the state to 
justify the disparate treatment of voters in every situation to which the 
statute might apply and struck down the law on its face. 
Similarly, in Kramer v. Union Free School District No. 15, the 
Court considered the effect of a law that granted the franchise to some 
eligible voters but not to others, analyzing not only the application of the 
law to the named plaintiffs but also to various other categories of 
potential voters.39 The voters successfully secured a ruling that the 
statute violated all voters’ rights, not just the voters who challenged the 
law.40 
In case after case in the 1960s, the Court considered facial 
challenges to election laws that potentially affected wide classes of 
otherwise eligible voters. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of 
Elections,41 the Court invalidated Virginia’s poll tax without any 
discussion of whether the poll tax actually affected the plaintiffs who 
brought the challenge.42 That is, there is no indication from the Court’s 
opinion that the named plaintiffs in Harper could not have paid the poll 
tax, but this did not stop the Court from considering a challenge to the 
law on its face. In some ways, therefore, the Court actually applied an 
overbreadth analysis, concluding that the poll tax at issue was 
unconstitutional once the state applied it to other valid voters even if the 
law was not necessarily invalid as applied to the named plaintiffs.43 
Voting is so important that the Court allowed the named plaintiffs to 
bring suit to vindicate the rights of others who might be denied the 
franchise because of the overbroad poll tax. However, even though 
                                                          
 37. Cipriano, 395 U.S. at 706. 
 38. Id. (quoting Kramer, 395 U.S. at 632). 
 39. Kramer, 395 U.S. at 630 (“Besides appellant and others who similarly live in their 
parents’ homes, the statute also disenfranchises the following persons (unless they are parents or 
guardians of children enrolled in the district public school): senior citizens and others living with 
children or relatives; clergy, military personnel, and others who live on tax-exempt property; 
boarders and lodgers; parents who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose children are 
too young to attend school; parents who neither own nor lease qualifying property and whose 
children attend private schools.”). 
 40. Id. at 633. 
 41. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
 42. Id. at 666; see also Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1965) (invalidating, on 
its face, a Virginia law that required voters in federal elections either to file a certificate of residence 
each year or, at their option, pay a poll tax). 
 43. Dorf, supra note 14, at 267; see also infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
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casting a ballot is a form of “speech,”44 the Court has never expressly 
adopted the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine for election law.45 As 
I discuss in Part V, this approach actually makes perfect sense for 
voting, a purportedly fundamental right.46 
The reapportionment cases during the 1960s similarly brought 
about wholesale changes via facial invalidation to how a state drew its 
electoral maps.47 For example, in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court held that 
Alabama’s attempt to redraw its state electoral districts was 
unconstitutional, as the state’s plan had the effect of making some votes 
in the state count more than others.48 The case presented a direct attack 
on the law for all voters and all districts, not just for the particular 
plaintiffs who brought suit. 
Thus, the election law decisions of the Warren Court embodied the 
height of using facial challenges to strike down election laws wholesale. 
The Burger Court of the 1970s and early 1980s began a gradual, albeit 
implicit, erosion of this practice. During this period, the Court began to 
construe election laws as applied to the particular plaintiff who brought 
suit and ignore potential facial challenges, even though it did not 
explicitly highlight this distinction. For example, in Storer v. Brown,49 
the Court analyzed a California ballot access law that limited who could 
appear on the ballot50 and determined that “if a candidate is absolutely 
and validly barred from the ballot by one provision of the laws, he 
cannot challenge other provisions as applied to other candidates.”51 
Thus, even if the ballot access law might be unconstitutional in some 
settings, that alone was not enough to invalidate the provision.52 
                                                          
 44. See, e.g., Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an 
Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) (noting that 
voting “is a right so fundamental that its protections are found twice in the U.S. Constitution: the 
First Amendment right to political speech, expressed through voting, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection of the act of voting as a fundamental right”). 
 45. One commentator suggests that the Court implicitly employed the overbreadth doctrine in 
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965). See John F. Decker, Overbreadth Outside the First 
Amendment, 34 N.M. L. REV. 53, 81-82 (2004).  
 46. See infra Part V. 
 47. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 536-37, 585-87 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 
368, 370, 380-81 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 187-88, 237 (1962). 
 48. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 536-37. 
 49. 415 U.S. 724 (1974). 
 50. Storer, 415 U.S. at 726-27. 
 51. Id. at 737. 
 52. Id. at 736-37 (“Having reached this result, there is no need to examine the 
constitutionality of the other provisions of the Elections Code as they operate singly or in 
combination as applied to these candidates. Even if these statutes were wholly or partly 
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Similarly, in Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Committee,53 the 
Court held that Ohio could not constitutionally apply its campaign 
disclosure requirements to the Ohio Socialist Workers Party, but the 
Court chose not to rule on the facial validity of the law.54 Cases like 
these, which quietly rejected facial challenges in favor of a piecemeal as-
applied approach, provided the foundation for the more recent and more 
explicit strict interpretation of the facial/as-applied dichotomy in 
election law cases. 
C. As-Applied Challenges in Election Law 
In the past few years, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected 
facial challenges while inviting as-applied challenges to laws regulating 
election administration.55 For example, in McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,56 the Court rejected a facial challenge to prohibitions on 
electioneering communications,57 but in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. 
Federal Election Commission,58 the Court ruled that McConnell had not 
foreclosed the possibility of a plaintiff bringing a successful as-applied 
challenge to these provisions.59 This demonstrates how the Court has 
generally closed the door to facial challenges to election laws while at 
the same time opening the door to considering piecemeal lawsuits 
regarding particular applications of a law. The Court has exhibited a 
willingness to wait before it overturns the entirety of an election 
regulation, instead preferring to see how the application of that law plays 
out in the context of an actual election.60 
During the 2007 Term, the Supreme Court heard two cases that 
directly involved a state’s ability to promulgate election rules and 
explicitly invoked the facial/as-applied distinction.61 In both cases, the 
                                                          
unconstitutional, [these candidates] were still properly barred from having their names placed on the 
1972 ballot.”). 
 53. 459 U.S. 87 (1982). 
 54. Id. at 101-02. 
 55. See, e.g., Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 597-98 (2005) (rejecting a facial challenge to 
Oklahoma’s semiclosed primary system). 
 56. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 57. Id. at 206-09. 
 58. 546 U.S. 410 (2006). 
 59. Id. at 412. 
 60. But see Davis v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771-74 (2008). As I explain 
below, the Court seemed to indicate in Davis that the statute inherently violated a candidate’s First 
Amendment rights, meaning that it was invalid in all situations. See infra text accompanying notes 
115-17. 
 61. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); Wash. State Grange v. 
Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). The Court heard two other election law cases 
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Court sided with the state, determining that states enjoy wide discretion 
in handling the “nuts-and-bolts” of election administration.62 The Court 
had been leaning toward rejecting facial challenges in other contexts for 
years,63 but the decisions in Washington State Grange and Crawford 
signify the zenith of the Court’s explicit admonition that it will allow 
only as-applied challenges to attack an election law. Between the 
Warren Court’s facial invalidation of many election laws in the 1960s 
and the Roberts Court’s explicit rejection of facial challenges in 
Washington State Grange and Crawford, the Court had implicitly 
rejected facial challenges in favor of an as-applied approach, but it had 
not explicitly made this distinction.64 As Professor Nathaniel Persily 
explains, Washington State Grange and Crawford therefore reflect a 
stark maturation in the Court’s use of the facial/as-applied dichotomy for 
election law, in that the cases “appear to signal a shift at least in the way 
the Court discusses as-applied and facial challenges, if not in what the 
Court means by the distinction.”65 As I discuss below, this shift presents 
significant ramifications for how judges shape the scope of the right to 
vote.66 It also leads to negative implications for the protection of voters’ 
rights. The effects of these cases show why the Court should refocus its 
election law jurisprudence. My solution, as presented more fully in Part 
V, is to abolish the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges 
that Washington State Grange and Crawford solidified in favor of a 
more lenient overbreadth standard. Before reaching a solution, however, 
we must precisely understand the holdings in these cases and why the 
Court’s approach is a cause for concern. 
1. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican 
Party 
In Washington State Grange, the Court considered Washington’s 
newly enacted primary scheme.67 Previously, Washington’s voters 
selected the candidates for the general election through a “blanket 
                                                          
during the 2007 Term, but neither explicitly invoked the facial/as-applied doctrine. See Davis, 128 
S. Ct. at 2765; N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 795 (2008). As Persily 
and Rosenberg point out, “In the context of campaign finance, regulation of political parties, and 
voter identification requirements, the opinions of the Roberts Court have discussed the as-
applied/facial issue to a degree never before seen in an election law case.” See Persily & Rosenberg, 
supra note 7, at 1658-59. 
 62. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1658-59. 
 63. See, e.g., Salerno v. United States, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 64. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.  
 65. Persily, supra note 7, at 96. 
 66. See infra Part IV. 
 67. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1187-88 (2008). 
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primary” system.68 In a blanket primary, candidates from all parties 
appeared on one ballot, and all voters selected from among those 
candidates, with the candidate receiving a plurality of votes within each 
major party moving on to the general election.69 After the Supreme 
Court invalidated a similar blanket primary system in California 
Democratic Party v. Jones,70 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck 
down Washington’s blanket primary system.71 In response, Washington 
State Grange, a civic organization, proposed an initiative to replace the 
invalidated primary system.72 The citizens of Washington approved the 
new initiative, and it became effective in December 2004.73 
Under the new primary system, a candidate for office must declare 
his or her “‘major or minor party preference, or independent status.’”74 
In turn, the primary election ballot designates each candidate’s party 
preference.75 The political party cannot disassociate itself from a 
candidate; thus, for example, a candidate who holds ideals repugnant to 
the Republican Party could list his or her party preference as Republican, 
and this preference would appear next to his or her name on the primary 
ballot. All voters can vote in Washington’s primary elections, and the 
two candidates who receive the most and second-most votes move on to 
the general election, regardless of their stated party preferences.76 
Immediately after the law went into effect, the Washington State 
Republican Party filed suit, challenging the law on its face.77 The 
Republican Party argued that the law violated its First Amendment right 
to freedom of association, because the law required the party to associate 
with a candidate whom the party did not necessarily endorse.78 In 
essence, the Republican Party asserted that the law was facially invalid 
because the party was forced to associate with any candidate claiming 
party affiliation.79 
The Supreme Court focused its analysis on the pre-election nature 
of the case—that is, the Republican Party challenged the law in the 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1188. 
 70. 530 U.S. 567, 586 (2000). 
 71. Democratic Party of Wash. State v. Reed, 343 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 72. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1189. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. (quoting WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.24.030 (West 2005)). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. The Washington State Democratic Central Committee and Libertarian Party of 
Washington State joined the Republican Party as plaintiffs. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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abstract, not in the context of an actual election.80 The Court noted that 
“[t]he State has had no opportunity to implement [the new primary 
system], and its courts have had no occasion to construe the law in the 
context of actual disputes arising from the electoral context, or to accord 
the law a limiting construction to avoid constitutional questions.”81 Lest 
readers not understand that this was the crux of the analysis, the Court 
reiterated this point several times.82 In particular, the Court focused on 
the fact that because the Republican Party challenged the primary system 
on its face, “we have no evidentiary record against which to assess their 
assertions that voters will be confused.”83 The Court warned that it could 
not speculate about “hypothetical” or “imaginary” cases,84 as 
“[e]xercising judicial restraint in a facial challenge ‘frees the Court not 
only from unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also 
from premature interpretations of statutes in areas where their 
constitutional application might be cloudy.’”85 The Court wanted to see a 
clear demonstration of what the ballot would look like under the new 
primary system before ruling on its constitutionality.86 
To support its decision, the majority took pains to emphasize that a 
facial challenge was inappropriate in this situation. The majority likely 
focused on this point to mask what seems to be an obvious fallacy in the 
Court’s analysis: Although it might be helpful to see the actual ballots 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 1190-91. 
 81. Id. at 1190. 
 82. See, e.g., id. at 1191 (noting that facial claims rest on “speculation”); id. at 1193 (“We 
reject each of [the Republican Party’s] contentions for the same reason: They all depend, not on any 
facial requirement [of the law], but on the possibility that voters will be confused as to the meaning 
of the party-preference designation. But [the Republican Party’s] assertion that voters will 
misinterpret the party-preference designation is sheer speculation.”); id. (“But these cases involve a 
facial challenge, and we cannot strike down [the law] on its face based on the mere possibility of 
voter confusion.”); id. at 1196-97 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“But because [the Republican Party] 
brought this challenge before the State of Washington had printed ballots for use under the new 
primary regime, we have no idea what those ballots will look like.”). 
 83. Id. at 1194 (majority opinion). 
 84. Id. at 1190. 
 85. Id. at 1191 (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960)). The Court 
distinguished a second type of facial challenge in the First Amendment context, whereby a court 
might construe a law to be overbroad because a “‘substantial number’ of its applications are 
unconstitutional, ‘judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’” Id. at 1190 n.6 
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769-71 (1982)). The Court warned for that this second 
type of facial challenge, “[w]e generally do not apply the ‘strong medicine’ of overbreadth analysis 
where the parties fail to describe the instances of arguable overbreadth of the contested law.” Id.; 
see also Hersh v. United States, 553 F.3d 743, 763 n.23 (5th Cir. 2008). The bulk of the Court’s 
decision regarding as-applied challenges and election administration, however, did not involve this 
First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. 
 86. See Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1197 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
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and the way in which they designate a candidate’s party preference, the 
Court’s decision in Washington State Grange seemed divorced from the 
reality of how voters would actually construe the meaning of the ballot.87 
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissent, voters who viewed the new 
ballots would obviously understand that they conveyed a political 
message that connected a party and a candidate, regardless of what the 
ballots actually looked like or how they read.88 Indeed, given the Court’s 
decision in Washington State Grange, it is difficult to imagine a scenario 
in which the Court will strike down any election regulation on its face 
before the state implements that law. If the Court simply could 
“imagine” a ballot design that would convey the message that the party 
and candidate were not politically associated, then the Court could 
probably imagine a similar scenario for any election law so as to 
construe it as constitutional. Simply put, the Court essentially eliminated 
the possibility of a pre-election facial challenge to any election law. As 
the Justices themselves noted, the only open avenue to challenge this 
type of law is through an as-applied challenge, when the Court can see 
the costs and benefits of using a particular law in an actual election.89 
2. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board 
The Court used its new precedent in Washington State Grange to 
send these same messages in Crawford v. Marion County Election 
Board.90 In Crawford, a political party, two elected officials, and several 
nonprofit organizations that represented groups of elderly, disabled, 
poor, and minority voters challenged Indiana’s requirement that voters 
show a photo identification to vote.91 Although the Court held that the 
                                                          
 87. Another explanation is that narrowing the focus to an as-applied challenge helped to 
create consensus on the Court. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1646 n.6. But, as Persily 
and Rosenberg point out, “The Court’s decision rejecting the facial challenge conflates two 
problems: the absence of a ballot (or state court interpretation) implementing the law and the 
absence of actual confusion arising from whatever ballot format the state employs.” Id. at 1666. 
 88. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1202 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It does not take a study to 
establish that when statements of party connection are the sole information listed next to candidate 
names on the ballot, those statements will affect voters’ perceptions of what the candidate stands 
for, what the party stands for, and whom they should elect.”). Another manner of understanding the 
Court’s approach is through the lens of ripeness and constitutional avoidance. See Persily, supra 
note 7, at 96; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1663-64. Ultimately, the Washington ballots for 
the 2008 election stated “(Prefers Republican Party)” or “(Prefers Democratic Party)” under the 
candidate’s name. See Sample Ballot - Kitsap County, Washington (Nov. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.kitsapgov.com/aud/elections/archive/08/sample%20ballot%20gen%202008.pdf. 
 89. Wash. State Grange, 128 S. Ct. at 1195 (“That factual determination must await an as-
applied challenge.”). 
 90. 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008); see also Persily, supra note 7, at 96.  
 91. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1614. 
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plaintiffs had standing to challenge the law,92 it rejected the plaintiffs’ 
facial challenge.93 The plaintiffs had argued that the voter identification 
law unduly burdened the right to vote for elderly, poor, and homeless 
voters and those who had a religious objection to being photographed.94 
Noting the “heavy burden of persuasion” for a facial challenge, the 
Court determined that the record was insufficient to invalidate the law.95 
The Court stated, “on the basis of the evidence in the record it is not 
possible to quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow 
class of voters or the portion of the burden imposed on them that is fully 
justified.”96 
For example, the Court found that the record was devoid of a 
reliable indicator of how many registered voters did not have photo 
identification.97 The Court also stated that there was no “concrete” 
evidence of the burden the law imposed on voters without an 
identification.98 Similarly, “[t]he record says virtually nothing about the 
difficulties faced by either indigent voters or voters with religious 
objections to being photographed.”99 Thus, the plaintiffs had failed to 
show that the statute lacked a “plainly legitimate sweep.”100 
However, the Court implicitly invited as-applied challenges to the 
law: The lead opinion noted that record evidence and facts of which it 
could take judicial notice suggested that Indiana’s voter identification 
law might impose a heavier burden on certain voters.101 In particular, the 
law might adversely affect elderly persons born out-of-state, people who 
would have difficulty obtaining a state-issued identification because of 
economic or other personal limitations, homeless people, or people with 
a religious objection to being photographed.102 Although the Court 
discounted the burdens that the law imposed based upon the record 
before it, it left open the possibility that these groups of voters could still 
challenge the law.103 The Court stated, however, that “even assuming 
that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is 
                                                          
 92. Id. at 1615 n.7. 
 93. Id. at 1622-23. 
 94. Id. at 1621. 
 95. Id. at 1622. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 1623 (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 
1190 (2008)). 
 101. Id. at 1621. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they 
seek [(facial invalidation)] in this litigation.”104 
The Court provided further guidance in a footnote, offering an 
explicit example of when the law might go too far: 
Presumably most voters casting provisional ballots will be able to 
obtain photo identifications before the next election. It is, however, 
difficult to understand why the State should require voters with a faith-
based objection to being photographed to cast provisional ballots 
subject to later verification in every election when the [Board of Motor 
Vehicles] is able to issue these citizens special licenses that enable 
them to drive without any photo identification.105 
Thus, although the Court would not invalidate the law on its face, it 
provided, in effect, an advisory opinion regarding when the law would 
overreach. Presumably, religious voters who object to being 
photographed can successfully challenge the law as applied to them.106 
As two election law commentators have suggested, this approach 
perhaps represents a “pragmatic” compromise, in that  
this model does discourage courts from second-guessing the overall 
reasonableness of controversial legislative enactments (reducing the 
risk of judicial conflict with the party-in-government), and it may help 
to lower the stakes of voting rights litigation (which, one might hope, 
will in turn reduce the likelihood that judges’ partisan preferences will 
influence their decisions).107 
Cutting the other way, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion seems to 
curtail the propriety of as-applied challenges to election regulations.108 
Justice Scalia advocated for an approach that provides clear answers, in 
which the Court determines whether a law imposes disproportionate 
burdens on certain voters (presumably in the abstract) and whether those 
burdens are too severe.109 The Court therefore should not consider 
whether a law imposes a severe burden on the particular voter who 
                                                          
 104. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 105. Id. at 1621 n.19. 
 106. One voter was already unsuccessful in his as-applied challenge to Indiana’s law. See 
Stewart v. Marion County, No 1:08-CV-586, 2008 WL 4690984, at *4-5 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 21, 2008). 
However, the plaintiff in that case did not present the hypothetical facts that the Supreme Court 
suggested could lead to a successful as-applied challenge (a religious voter who objected to 
obtaining an identification with a photograph). See Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1621 n.19. 
 107. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Edward B. Foley, Gatekeeping vs. Balancing in the 
Constitutional Law of Elections: Methodological Uncertainty on the High Court, 17 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 507, 535 (2008). 
 108. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 109. Id. at 1624-25. 
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brought suit given that voter’s specific circumstances.110 It follows that a 
holding “that burdens are not severe if they are ordinary and widespread 
would be rendered meaningless if a single plaintiff could claim a severe 
burden.”111 Justice Scalia explicitly recognized the pitfalls of 
encouraging as-applied litigation in this setting, given that “[t]his is an 
area where the dos and don’ts need to be known in advance of the 
election” and “[a] case-by-case approach naturally encourages constant 
litigation.”112 Thus, it seems that one reason Justice Scalia concurred 
only in the judgment was his disagreement that the voter identification 
law might be invalid as applied to certain individuals.113 Justice Scalia 
wanted to go further and hold the law constitutional in every application; 
that is, rule that the law is facially valid.114 
The import of these two cases is not necessarily that every election 
law plaintiff must bring his or her suit only as applied. For example, in a 
recent campaign finance case, the Court struck down the so-called 
“Millionaire’s Amendment” on its face, stating that Congress could not 
allow disproportionate campaign finance limits for opponents of self-
financed candidates.115 But in that case, the Court seemed to indicate that 
because of the inherent First Amendment implications of the law, there 
was no meaningful way for the statute validly to apply to some 
candidates and not to others.116 Once a self-financed candidate 
contributed a certain amount to his or her own election campaign, the 
statute automatically raised the contribution limit for that candidate’s 
opponent.117 Thus, even if an opposing candidate never actually took 
advantage of the increased contribution limit, the law still “harmed” the 
self-financed candidate by opening the door to unequal contribution 
opportunities. Further, the Court is arguably more hostile to campaign 
finance regulations than to run-of-the-mill election laws, so it is possible 
that the Court was more receptive to remedying a theoretical harm from 
                                                          
 110. Id. at 1625. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1626. 
 113. Id. at 1624 (“The lead opinion assumes petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification 
law ‘may have imposed a special burden on’ some voters, but holds that petitioners have not 
assembled evidence to show that the special burden is severe enough to warrant strict scrutiny[.] 
That is true enough, but for the sake of clarity and finality (as well as adherence to precedent), I 
prefer to decide these cases on the grounds that petitioners’ premise is irrelevant and that the burden 
at issue is minimal and justified.”) (citations omitted). 
 114. See id. 
 115. Davis v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2773 (2008). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2770.  
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a campaign finance provision.118 In this circumstance, the Court struck 
down the law in its entirety.119 Accordingly, I do not argue that the only 
way to achieve success in challenging a law that regulates an election is 
to bring an as-applied challenge.120 Rather, potential plaintiffs should be 
cognizant that, based on the Court’s pronouncements in Washington 
State Grange and Crawford, the Court has shifted its focus to prefer as-
applied litigation in election law.121 
3. Recent Lower Court Decisions 
Before looking at the larger trends in election law litigation 
stemming from Washington State Grange and Crawford, it is interesting 
to note that lower courts deciding recent election law disputes have 
seemed to mimic the Supreme Court’s approach, rejecting facial 
challenges while inviting litigation regarding election laws as applied to 
particular voters, candidates, or political parties. This suggests that the 
implicit message from the Supreme Court had begun to trickle down to 
lower courts even before Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
laying the groundwork for lower courts’ immediate and explicit 
application of the rule after the Supreme Court’s decisions in these 
cases. It further underscores that Washington State Grange and 
Crawford did not dramatically alter the election law landscape but were 
instead catalysts for making this trend more pronounced and explicit. 
For example, in Miller v. Brown122—decided before Washington 
State Grange and Crawford—the Fourth Circuit rejected a facial 
challenge to Virginia’s open primary law but ruled that the law was 
unconstitutional as applied to the particular situation in that case, in 
which a political party wished to exclude those who had voted for a 
                                                          
 118. See Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court 1 
(Columbia Law Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 09-198, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1338895. 
 119. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 2773. 
 120. Further, this analysis is not meant to suggest that the Roberts Court rejects facial 
challenges wholesale. In addition to Davis, the Court sustained a facial challenge to the District of 
Columbia handgun ban in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). See Metzger, 
supra note 118, at 8-9. 
 121. Compare McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003) (rejecting a 
facial challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 
(2002)), with Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2659 (2007) 
(holding the same statute unconstitutional as applied to the specific advertisements in that case). 
Persily and Rosenberg suggest that the Court in Wisconsin Right to Life came close to striking down 
every application of the law in question by carving out an exception to the law that almost 
swallowed the rule. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1662-63. 
 122. 503 F.3d 360, 368 (4th Cir. 2007). 
  
654 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:635 
candidate of a different party from participating in the primary.123 The 
court found that the law was permissible in the abstract because Virginia 
provided parties with several ways to exclude voters in the candidate-
selection process, but that the State had failed to justify the burdens the 
law imposed in this situation given that the incumbent had selected, as 
was his choice, a primary for this election.124 Thus, the court preferred a 
slower adjudication, allowing the State of Virginia to regulate its 
election but striking down those applications that went too far. 
Similarly, in Alaskan Independence Party v. Alaska125—decided in 
October 2008, after Washington State Grange and Crawford—the 
political party argued that Alaska’s mandatory direct primary system, in 
which all candidates on the general election ballot had to be “‘nominated 
in a primary election by a direct vote of the people,’” violated its 
associational rights.126 The party contended that the state’s mandatory 
primary improperly compelled it to nominate its candidates through a 
primary election instead of a convention and unfairly permitted 
candidates to claim affiliation with the party even if that candidate did 
not espouse the party’s beliefs.127 The Ninth Circuit rejected the party’s 
facial challenge to the mandatory primary system.128 The court instead 
required the party to show that the law impermissibly forced it to 
associate with a particular person who did not share the party’s values.129 
Moreover, the court held that the proper way to challenge the state’s law 
regarding whether it impermissibly allowed candidates who did not 
agree with the party to claim affiliation was through as-applied 
litigation.130 Thus, the party was unsuccessful in its facial challenge, but 
the court opened the door to possible future as-applied challenges to the 
law.131 
Another similar trend stemming from this mode of adjudication is 
that lower courts often try to narrow their holdings, especially when 
invalidating an election regulation. As the Second Circuit noted when 
holding that it was unconstitutional for New York to deny absentee 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 371. 
 124. Id. at 368, 371. 
 125. 545 F.3d 1173, 1181 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 126. Id. at 1175 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.010 (2008)). 
 127. Id. at 1177, 1180. 
 128. Id. at 1180. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1181 (stating that “to the extent Appellants argue that certain specific candidates for 
office have been improperly certified by Alaska in the past, these challenges would be properly 
brought on an as-applied, not facial, challenge”) (citing Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State 
Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008)). 
 131. See id. 
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ballots for elections for political party county committees when it 
provided absentee ballots for every other election, 
[t]he fact pattern here is unusual, and our holding in this case is 
necessarily narrow. We do not hold that there is a general 
constitutional right to obtain absentee ballots. Nor do we hold that 
there is a constitutional right to obtain absentee ballots in all county 
committee races in New York State. Instead, after applying a 
deferential standard of review, and after examining the record in this 
as-applied challenge, we conclude that the arguments proffered by the 
State are so extraordinarily weak that they cannot justify the burdens 
imposed by Election Law § 7-122.132 
Of course, circuit courts have not altogether rejected the possibility 
of invalidating an election law on its face. In striking down a North 
Carolina campaign finance regulation as violative of the First 
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit recognized that striking down the law as 
applied would simply lead to additional litigation, with little resolution 
of the underlying issues.133 Therefore, there is not an absolute rule 
against facial challenges but instead a preference, in most situations, for 
piecemeal adjudication through as-applied litigation. This preference has 
increased in the wake of Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
showing that, while there was a mild preference for as-applied litigation 
before these cases, the Court’s pronouncements have been catalysts for 
further rejection of facial challenges to state election regulations. 
In sum, based on a quick survey of recent circuit court cases, it 
seems that although lower courts may have implicitly understood that 
facial challenges are disfavored in election law cases, Washington State 
Grange and Crawford solidified and increased the practice of rejecting 
facial constitutional challenges and limiting election law cases to as-
applied litigation. But this does not explain whether these two Supreme 
Court cases significantly altered the results in election law decisions. An 
examination of federal circuit and district court cases before and after 
these two Supreme Court cases will demonstrate whether voters, 
advocacy groups, political parties, and candidates now have a harder 
                                                          
 132. Price v. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 133. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2008). The court stated, 
The number of as-applied challenges necessary to remedy the over-breadth and 
vagueness of this multi-factored statutory test would involve many different lawsuits and 
litigation that would take years to conclude. In the meantime, political speakers would be 
left at sea, and, worse, subject to the prospect that the State’s view of the acceptability of 
the speaker’s point of view would influence whether or not administrative enforcement 
action was initiated. 
Id. 
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time in achieving wholesale changes to a state’s election practice 
because of these decisions. 
III. ANALYSIS OF 2004 AND 2008 ELECTION LAW CASES 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Marion County 
Election Board may have been the most significant election law case 
since Bush v. Gore.134 The debate over voter identification was deeply 
partisan and continues to rage.135 As I observed above, lying beneath the 
surface of this partisan debate—and the decision in Washington State 
Grange—was an explicit shift in how the Court views election law 
challenges. This Part seeks to determine whether the Court’s decisions in 
Washington State Grange and Crawford had an immediate impact on 
how voters, candidates, or political parties may bring constitutional 
challenges to election regulations. To that end, I have analyzed the cases 
that have cited these decisions so far and have compared the success 
rates of constitutional challenges to election regulations before and after 
the Court’s 2008 decisions. Although the sentiment against facial 
challenges may have already been present underneath the surface of 
lower courts’ election law decisions, Washington State Grange and 
Crawford made the distinction between facial and as-applied litigation 
more explicit, thereby altering the outcome in some cases and making it 
easier for states to defend their election regimes. 
A. Cases Explicitly Relying upon Washington State Grange and 
Crawford 
One measure of determining if Washington State Grange and 
Crawford have had an immediate impact is to study the manner in which 
lower courts have cited these two decisions. The analysis shows that 
these cases affected the way in which political actors were able to 
                                                          
 134. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (finding that the Florida Supreme Court’s 
method for recounting votes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment but 
ruling that no other method was possible within the short time period before Florida needed to 
certify its electoral votes). The decision effectively resolved the 2000 presidential election in favor 
of George W. Bush. 
 135. See Spencer Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REV. 631, 638-44 (2007) 
(providing a summation of voter identification measures); Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing 
the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 
J.L. & POL., available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1287735 (forthcoming 
2009) (empirically assessing the effect of Indiana’s voter identification laws on voters during the 
2008 primary election); Kelley Shannon & Jay Root, Democrats Stop Voter ID Bill, HOUSTON 
CHRON., May 27, 2009, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/ap/tx/6442809.html 
(discussing the Texas legislature’s attempt to enact a voter identification law). 
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challenge a government’s electoral practice and also influenced the 
procedure for other non-election law constitutional challenges.  
In the year subsequent to the Court’s decision in Crawford,136 
federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and state courts have cited 
Washington State Grange sixty times and have cited Crawford thirty-
four times.137 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of lower courts’ 
reliance on these cases is that many of them have nothing to do with 
election law.138 Instead, courts have cited Washington State Grange and, 
to a lesser extent, Crawford, for general principles of law regarding the 
availability of as-applied challenges in various settings. 
  
                                                          
 136. As Crawford is the later of the two cases, I have confined my research to the year 
following this decision, that is, all decisions citing either case through April 28, 2009. This cut-off 
date is inherently arbitrary, but it allows for a full year’s analysis of the trickle-down effect of both 
cases. Reviewing all lower court decisions within a year of Crawford (as opposed to within a year 
of Washington State Grange) makes sense in light of the fact that Crawford strongly reinforced the 
original as-applied ruling in Washington State Grange. Thus, the combination of these two cases 
sent a particularly strong signal regarding the proper approach to challenging an election regulation. 
This analysis therefore also includes the three cases that cited Washington State Grange between the 
date of that decision, March 18, 2008, and the date of the Crawford decision, April 28, 2008. Those 
three decisions are: In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700 (5th Cir. 2008) (decided on 
April 11, 2008), Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 549 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008) (decided on April 
11, 2008), and Skynet Corp. v. Slattery, No. 06-cv-218, 2008 WL 924531 (D.N.H. Mar. 31, 2008). 
None of these three are election law cases, and all cited Washington State Grange for the general as-
applied proposition. 
 137. See app. tbls.1 & 2, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/ 
LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n03_CC1-Douglas_Appendix.pdf. 
 138. See, e.g., Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 544 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2008), 
amended and rehearing denied, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that the Federal 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324a-24b (2006), did not preempt the 
Legal Arizona Workers Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 23-211-26 (LexisNexis 2007), and citing 
Crawford for the proposition that plaintiffs bear a heavy burden when bringing a facial challenge); 
In re Katrina Canal Litig. Breaches, 524 F.3d 700, 711 (5th Cir. 2008) (affirming the denial of a 
motion to remand to state court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2000), and 
citing Washington State Grange for the proposition that a court should rest its decision on the 
narrowest ground possible). 
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Crawford 32 2 23 11 9  28140 
Table 1: Cases Citing Washington State Grange and Crawford within 
One Year after the Court Decided Crawford on April 28, 2008 
Forty-four of the sixty decisions citing Washington State Grange 
are not election law cases.141 All of these cases cited Washington State 
Grange solely for the general proposition that courts prefer as-applied 
instead of facial challenges.142 Thus, it appears that Washington State 
Grange had a somewhat significant impact on all constitutional 
adjudication, not just election law cases. This comports with the Roberts 
Court’s general disposition against facial challenges.143 That is, the 
immediate impact of Washington State Grange has been to solidify the 
Roberts Court’s preference for as-applied litigation,144 both in election 
law and other cases. 
Only sixteen cases citing Washington State Grange dealt directly 
with an election law issue,145 and of those cases, twelve cited the 
decision for the as-applied proposition.146 When cited in an election law 
case, therefore, the as-applied holding had a significant impact on lower 
                                                          
 139. Note that in four of the eight cases, the courts cited Washington State Grange for both the 
as-applied proposition and another proposition. See app. tbl.1, supra note 137. 
 140. Note that in three of the twenty-eight cases, the courts cited Crawford for both the as-
applied proposition and another proposition. See app. tbl.2, supra note 137. 
 141. See app. tbl.1, supra note 137. 
 142. See app. tbl.1, supra note 137. 
 143. See, e.g., Hartnett, supra note 15, at 1758; Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the 
Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 959 n.318 (2008); Metzger, supra note 118. 
 144. See Metzger, supra note 118.  
 145. One case that cited Washington State Grange was merely the remand of that case to the 
Ninth Circuit. See Wash. State Republican Party v. Washington, 545 F.3d 1125, 1126 (9th Cir. 
2008). I have excluded this remanded case from my analysis. 
 146. See app. tbl.1, supra note 137. 
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courts’ decisions. By contrast, only two cases cited Washington State 
Grange for its actual substantive holding: that the First Amendment 
protects the right of a political party to choose its own nominee for 
public office.147 Of course, this holding is not widely applicable, so the 
fact that courts have not relied upon it is not particularly surprising. 
What is more noteworthy is that the as-applied holding from Washington 
State Grange has had a vibrant independent life. Only four of the sixty 
cases that cited Washington State Grange did not cite it for the standard 
regarding facial versus as-applied challenges; all four instead cited the 
decision as the Court’s most recent formulation of the “severe burden” 
test for election law cases.148 
Thus, the data demonstrate that the main impact of Washington 
State Grange so far has been its ruminations on facial versus as-applied 
challenges. This holds true for both election law cases and cases 
involving challenges to other types of statutes. That is, Washington State 
Grange represents a higher hurdle for all plaintiffs who wish to vindicate 
their rights against a governmental practice, not just voters. Instead of 
having a unique impact on election law, the focus on as-applied 
challenges has had broader implications for various types of statutes that 
plaintiffs believe go too far. By contrast, Washington State Grange 
seems to have had much narrower consequences on the substantive 
election law issue the Court decided. In sum, the legacy of Washington 
State Grange may very well be the channeling of litigation seeking to 
overturn statutes to as-applied challenges, but not solely for election law 
cases. 
It appears that Crawford will have a slightly different legacy. Of 
the thirty-four cases that cited Crawford within a year of the decision, 
twenty-three involved a challenge to a state’s election practice.149 That 
is, in comparison to Washington State Grange, Crawford has had a 
narrower impact on other areas of the law and is used mostly in election 
law cases. Lower courts cite Crawford for a range of propositions. Of 
those thirty-four cases citing Crawford, merely nine do so for the 
                                                          
 147. Alaskan Independence Party v. Alaska, 545 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008); Kurita v. 
State Primary Bd. of the Tenn. Democratic Party, No. 3:08-0948, 2008 WL 4601574, at *7, *16 
(M.D. Tenn. Oct. 14, 2008). 
 148. Nader v. Brewer, 531 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2008); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. 
McPherson, No. C06-4670, 2008 WL 4183981, at *14-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2008); Walton v. Dir., 
Mo. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 4:08CV596, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41477, at *30 (E.D. Mo. May 23, 
2008); Mowles v. Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 958 A.2d 897, 904 (Me. 
2008). 
 149. See app. tbl.2, supra note 137. 
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holding that challenges to a statute can only be as applied.150 Six of those 
nine cases were election law decisions.151 By contrast, the majority of 
lower court cases citing Crawford did so for other propositions relating 
to election law, such as the constitutionality of photo identification 
laws152 or the general recitation of the “severe burden” test.153 
Finally, Washington State Grange and Crawford have had very 
little impact on state courts, and state judges most often cited these cases 
in election law decisions. State judges cited Washington State Grange 
only four times, twice in cases involving election law and three times for 
the as-applied proposition.154 Similarly, state courts cited Crawford only 
twice, both times in an election law case and both times for Crawford’s 
substantive holding.155 Accordingly, neither case has had a major impact 
on state courts, but, much like the federal courts, state courts are more 
likely to cite Washington State Grange for the as-applied proposition 
and Crawford for its holding on voter identification. 
As this discussion indicates, with regard to limiting lawsuits to as-
applied challenges, Washington State Grange and Crawford work in 
tandem. Washington State Grange applies broadly to all types of 
constitutional disputes and stands for the proposition that facial 
challenges are disfavored. Crawford, by contrast, applies more narrowly, 
mostly to election law cases, and lower courts cited that decision for a 
wide range of concepts, including the channeling of election law 
                                                          
 150. See app. tbl.2, supra note 137. 
 151. See app. tbl.2, supra note 137. 
 152. See, e.g., Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 554 F.3d 1340, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Am. 
Civil Liberties Union of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1316-17 (10th Cir. 2008); NAACP v. 
Browning, 569 F. Supp. 2d 1237, 1240, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 2008). 
 153. See, e.g., Lemons v. Bradbury, 538 F.3d 1098, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008); Walton, 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 41477, at *30-32. 
 154. See Abbott v. Burke, No. M-969, 2009 WL 1064462, at 66 (Trial Order) (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. Mar. 24, 2009) (Opinion/Recommendations to the Supreme Court) (citing Washington 
State Grange for the as-applied proposition in a case about state funding for schools); Independence 
Inst. v. Coffman, No. 07CA1151, 2008 WL 5006531, at *4 (Colo App. Nov. 26, 2008) (citing 
Washington State Grange in an election law case for the as-applied proposition); Mowles v. 
Comm’n on Governmental Ethics & Election Practices, 958 A.2d 897, 904 (Me. 2008) (pointing to 
Washington State Grange in an election law case for the proposition that “[t]he ‘mere possibility of 
voter confusion’ is insufficient to establish a compelling state interest” (quoting Wash. State Grange 
v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1193 (2008))); In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal 
Church Prop. Litig., CL 2007-0248724, 2008 Va. Cir. LEXIS 85, at *11 (Va. Cir. Ct. June 27, 
2008) (citing Washington State Grange for the as-applied proposition in a case not involving 
election law). 
 155. See Curley v. Lake County Bd. of Elections & Registration, 896 N.E.2d 24, 27 n.4 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 2008) (citing Crawford for its substantive holding regarding voter identification); Las 
Vegas Convention & Visitors Auth. v. Miller, 191 P.3d 1138, 1155-56 n.98 (Nev. 2008) (citing 
Crawford in an election law case for its substantive holding). 
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challenges to as-applied litigation. This also holds true for state court 
cases, although state courts have cited these decisions much less often. 
Most important for the purposes of this Article, lower courts have used 
both cases several times to reject plaintiffs’ facial challenges to both 
election laws and other laws. 
Therefore, what we see is a gradual shift limiting the ability of 
voters and others to vindicate their rights. Lower federal court decisions 
citing Washington State Grange and Crawford show that they do not 
represent a sea change in the law, but the tides are certainly turning. This 
makes sense, as one staple of Supreme Court jurisprudence is its 
adherence to gradual change.156 But it still should sound an alarm 
regarding how judges define the scope of the right to vote, as I discuss in 
Part IV. 
Any conclusions we can draw from this analysis, however, are 
necessarily opaque, as lower courts’ records in citing these cases have 
been mixed. Washington State Grange stands for the proposition that 
plaintiffs in all areas, including election law, typically may vindicate 
their rights only through as-applied challenges, while Crawford stands 
for various propositions more specifically related to election law. In the 
next sub-Part, I explore whether these cases were also catalysts for an 
unstated general movement in the law disfavoring broad challenges to 
election regulations. 
B. Comparison of 2004 and 2008 Lower Federal Court Decisions 
Washington State Grange and Crawford signify the Court’s desire 
to allow governmental entities to experiment with various election 
regimes, making it even harder for political actors to challenge election 
laws. Even if courts do not directly cite these cases, the Court sent the 
signal that judicial temperament toward election law should be to protect 
the power of the states in managing elections, thereby making it harder 
for political actors to vindicate their rights. The default is now to uphold 
the government’s election regime. 
Comparing federal election law decisions in 2004 and 2008 is one 
logical way to discern whether the Court’s rejection of facial challenges 
had an immediate adverse effect on voters’ rights.157 The 2004 election 
                                                          
 156. See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 301 (1996) 
(arguing that “measured” change in constitutional adjudication allows for stability and protects the 
judiciary from political activism). 
 157. Of course, this is not to say that all of the cases in 2008 involved the 2008 election, as 
several cases dealt with previous elections and simply reached the courts in this year. I use 2004 and 
2008 merely as measurement tools to analyze the manner in which courts decide election law cases. 
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cycle was rife with election law litigation, particularly because 2004 was 
a presidential election year.158 The 2008 election was similarly full of 
election-related litigation, and most of these cases came down after the 
Court rendered its decisions in Washington State Grange and 
Crawford.159 Thus, the political and judicial landscape was largely the 
same in these years,160 and one major difference was the Court’s 
decisions in these two cases. In essence, cases during 2004 provide a 
“control” group, with the intervening Supreme Court cases potentially 
altering how lower courts approached election law decisions in 2008. 
Lower courts immediately take notice of new Supreme Court case law, 
so this analysis presents one simplified manner of discerning the impact 
of Washington State Grange and Crawford. Although not a perfect 
measure, comparing election law cases in these two years will provide 
an initial indication as to whether voters now have a higher burden as a 
result of these cases. 
The Court decided Washington State Grange on March 18, 2008,161 
and Crawford on April 28, 2008,162 well before the November 4, 2008 
election. In 2008, only one federal court of appeals decision (out of 
fifteen) and seventeen district court decisions (out of eighty-six) 
considering the constitutionality of an election law came down before 
the Court decided Washington State Grange.163 Thus, there was ample 
time for the general principles surrounding Washington State Grange 
and Crawford to have an immediate impact on the lower courts, and in 
turn, on the political process during the 2008 election. 
                                                          
Further, courts during presidential election years are no doubt more involved in judicial rulemaking 
for elections during this time, when the issues are particularly ripe. See Persily, supra note 7, at 89 
(noting that the Court often decides election law issues that “have immediate thematic relevance to 
the ongoing campaign, even when the Court is not actually deciding a case that grows out of the 
campaign itself. Such was the case with the Supreme Court’s election law docket from the 2007-
2008 term and the historic 2008 election.”). 
 158. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1, 28-29 
(2007) (finding a large increase in election litigation since 2000); Charles Anthony Smith & 
Christopher Shortell, The Suits That Counted: The Judicialization of Presidential Elections, 6 
ELECTION L.J. 251, 252-53 (2007). 
 159. As I discuss below, I exclude from my analysis lower court decisions in 2008 that came 
down before the Supreme Court issued Washington State Grange, the first of these two cases. See 
text infra Part III.B.1-.2; see also infra note 166. 
 160. Of course, by 2008, there were more President George W. Bush appointees on the federal 
bench; the influence of political ideology on election law cases is an area that requires further study. 
 161. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184 (2008). 
 162. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
 163. See app. tbls.5 & 6, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/ 
LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n03_CC1-Douglas_Appendix.pdf.  
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My analysis is not intended to demonstrate a direct impact from 
these cases to a statistically significant level for the entirety of election 
law. The sample sizes are too small to make any definitive conclusions. I 
have also omitted a comparison of state court cases during these periods 
in an effort to simplify the analysis, especially given that these Supreme 
Court decisions directly bind state courts only when the courts construe 
federal law. Instead, I make a narrower finding from this data: There is a 
discernable trend of federal judges becoming more likely to favor the 
governmental entity in election law cases. Thus, although not 
statistically significant, I surmise that the evidence discussed below 
shows that current judicial temperament—stemming in particular from 
the as-applied rule in Washington State Grange and Crawford—is to 
uphold the government’s election-related conduct. 
1. Courts of Appeals 
The federal courts of appeals seemed slightly less likely to strike 
down an election law in 2008—after Washington State Grange and 
Crawford—as compared to 2004. Courts of appeals rendered seventeen 
reported decisions on the constitutionality of a state’s election regulation 
in 2004.164 The courts upheld the election law in its entirety in eight of 
these cases, meaning that the state won 47.1% of the time.165 For 
comparison purposes, when omitting the three cases that the courts of 
appeals decided from January 1, 2004, to March 18, 2004 (the date in 
2008 when the Supreme Court decided Washington State Grange),166 the 
                                                          
 164. See app. tbl.3, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/ 
LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n03_CC1-Douglas_Appendix.pdf. In this analysis, I use the word 
“state” as an overarching term to include the governmental entity that promulgates a particular 
election law under review. 
 165. I have placed a case that upholds one part of a law but strikes down another portion in the 
“law struck down” column, as the court struck down at least part of the state’s election scheme. By 
invalidating even a portion of a law, the court is altering the status quo and essentially telling the 
state that it has gone too far in promulgating its electoral processes. Even if a court upholds part of a 
law, therefore, its action in invalidating another portion sends a powerful message about the limits 
of governmental regulation of elections. For example, in Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d 651, 654, 
675-77 (6th Cir. 2004), the court struck down seven and upheld two Kentucky election law statutes. 
Because the panel decision struck down a portion of the state’s election code, this case falls into the 
“law struck down” bucket. 
 166. For comparison purposes, I analyzed cases decided between March 18 and the end of the 
year in both 2004 and 2008 (the Court decided Washington State Grange on March 18, 2008). If the 
as-applied rule from Washington State Grange and Crawford trickled down to lower courts, one 
would expect to observe this trend beginning with Washington State Grange. Crawford, the later 
case, reinforced this rule. Accordingly, it makes sense to measure the effect of these decisions from 
the first case stating the new rule. 
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state’s success rate rises to 50.0% (the court upheld the state’s regulation 
in its entirety seven of fourteen times). 
In 2008, the federal courts of appeals made a substantive ruling 
about the constitutionality of a particular election law in fifteen cases 
and upheld the law in its entirety in nine of them, meaning that the state 
won in 60% of the cases.167 Only one of these cases came down before 
the Court’s decision in Washington State Grange on March 18, 2008;168 
as the state lost that case,169 omitting it from the analysis brings the 
government’s success rate up to 64.3%. In short, governmental entities 
were slightly more successful in defending their election schemes in 
2008: after Washington State Grange, the state won 64.3% of the time, 
and in 2004 for the same time period, the state won only 50.0% of the 
cases. Thus, the federal courts of appeals seemed more likely to reject an 
election law challenge in 2008.170 Although it is impossible to know 
definitively if Washington State Grange and Crawford were directly 
responsible for this shift or if there are simply too few cases to signify an 
actual change, it does suggest that the road to challenging the 
constitutionality of a state’s election regulation may have become 
slightly steeper. 
                                                          
 167. See app. tbl.4, available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Academics/Journals/ 
LawReview/lrv_issues_v37n03_CC1-Douglas_Appendix.pdf. 
 168. Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 169. Id. at 377. 
 170. Again, I do not mean to suggest that these results are statistically significant. Rather, they 
provide a glimpse into the overall trend in the federal courts. 
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Table 2: Federal Courts of Appeals Invalidation of Election Laws, 
2004 and 2008 
Because the sample size is so small, an examination of the types of 
cases in which the court struck down an election law provides a more 
cogent analysis. As mentioned above, in 2004 the federal courts of 
appeals struck down a state’s election practice nine times.171 Several of 
these cases may have gone the other way after the Court closed the door 
to facial challenges. Consider Anderson v. Spear.172 Hobart Anderson 
sought to conduct a write-in candidacy in Kentucky’s gubernatorial 
election.173 In October 1999, before the election, he brought suit, seeking 
an injunction and declaratory judgment that several of Kentucky’s 
election laws were unconstitutional.174 He alleged that the laws in 
question prohibited him from conducting several campaign activities.175 
But he did not bring an as-applied challenge, asserting that the state had 
unconstitutionally applied the laws to him during the election; rather, he 
                                                          
 171. See supra note 165.  
 172. 356 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 173. Id. at 653-54. 
 174. Id. at 654. 
 175. Id. 
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brought a pre-election facial challenge.176 Although the election in 
question had already taken place, the Sixth Circuit struck down several 
of the provisions.177 For example, the court held that Kentucky’s 500-
foot “buffer zone” around a polling place, within which a candidate 
could not distribute literature, was overbroad.178 This is a proper 
application of the overbreadth doctrine, as it is particularly warranted for 
all types of election laws, not just those that impact political expression 
or other First Amendment ideals.179 Unlike in an as-applied approach, 
however, to win on this claim, the court did not require Anderson to 
show that he attempted to hand out literature or that the state was going 
to apply the law specifically to him. Instead, the court allowed him to 
bring a successful facial challenge to the law.180 The court also struck 
down the definition of “contribution” in the state’s campaign finance 
laws as facially unconstitutional because it did not include a candidate’s 
contributions to his or her own campaign accounts.181 
Under the current Washington State Grange/Crawford regime, 
however, Anderson may not have prevailed on his facial challenges. 
Instead, the court would have had to consider whether the 500-foot 
buffer zone, as applied to Anderson’s attempt to distribute materials 
within the zone at a particular polling site, violated that candidate’s 
constitutional rights. A court might find, for example, that a 500-foot 
buffer zone is perfectly appropriate for some precincts but not for others 
given the arrangement of the precinct and the amount of intrusive 
campaigning at that site. The proper inquiry would be whether a 500-
foot barrier presented an unconstitutional burden at the polling sites 
where Anderson sought and was denied the ability to campaign. 
Similarly, the definition of “contribution” may have been constitutional 
in certain applications but not others, which is exactly when, under 
Washington State Grange and Crawford, only an as-applied challenge is 
appropriate. Thus, the push toward as-applied challenges in the 2008 
election law cases—and the concomitant rejection of pre-election 
challenges—might have changed the outcome in Anderson. 
American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada v. Heller182 presents a 
similar story. In that case, the American Civil Liberties Union brought a 
                                                          
 176. Id. 
 177. See generally id. (striking down seven Kentucky election law statutes). The court upheld 
two of the provisions. See id. at 675-77. 
 178. Id. at 662-63. 
 179. See infra Part V. 
 180. Id. at 656. 
 181. Id. at 666-67. 
 182. 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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successful facial overbreadth challenge to a Nevada law that required 
certain groups or entities publishing campaign literature to reveal, in the 
publication itself, the names and addresses of the publications’ financial 
sponsors.183 A court, after Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
might well conclude that the state was justified in requiring disclosure 
for certain types of donors, or perhaps donations over a certain amount. 
That is, a court might now be hesitant to strike down a disclosure law in 
every circumstance, instead preferring piecemeal litigation to determine 
when the disclosure requirement is appropriate. Of course, the court in 
Heller determined that the law was overbroad under the First 
Amendment,184 so if the Court adopts the overbreadth doctrine for 
election law cases generally, as I advocate below, then the rule from 
Washington State Grange and Crawford would not apply. But the proper 
approach is now less clear after these two decisions. 
One more example drives home the point and highlights the notion 
that Washington State Grange and Crawford gave states wider leeway to 
experiment in their election schemes. In Green Party of New York State 
v. New York State Board of Elections,185 the Second Circuit upheld a 
preliminary injunction against New York’s application of one of its 
voter enrollment regulations.186 Under the statute in question, if a 
political party failed to receive at least 50,000 votes for that party’s 
gubernatorial candidate, the State Board of Elections was required to 
remove that party’s name from the voter registration form and convert 
all voters affiliated with that party to non-enrolled status.187 The Second 
Circuit held that the political parties had a substantial likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits, implicitly stating that the law was 
unconstitutional.188 The court limited its holding to the political parties 
listed in the injunction, which comports with an as-applied challenge, as 
it affected only those political parties who did not receive 50,000 votes 
in the gubernatorial election but still could show a modicum of 
support.189 Nevertheless, the language the court used to describe the 
burdens the law imposed on the parties and the failure of the state to 
justify those burdens suggests that the law could not withstand 
                                                          
 183. Id. at 981. 
 184. Id. at 1002. 
 185. 389 F.3d 411 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 186. Id. at 422-23.  
 187. Id. at 415. 
 188. Id. at 422-23. 
 189. Id. at 422. 
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constitutional scrutiny in any of its applications.190 Thus, the import of 
the court’s decision was that the law was invalid on its face. After 
Washington State Grange and Crawford, however, the court may have 
been more hesitant to make this broad pronouncement if it could 
consider only how the state had actually applied the statute to the 
political parties in question. Perhaps there was a setting in which the 
state could validly apply the law, such as if the state coupled the 50,000 
vote requirement with the lack of other indicators that the political party 
remained viable. Accordingly, after Washington State Grange and 
Crawford, the court might have been less willing to make a sweeping 
statement on the validity of this election regulation. 
In 2008, by contrast, the courts of appeals were slightly more 
stringent in sustaining only as-applied challenges. As mentioned above, 
the federal courts of appeals struck down portions of a state’s election 
law in six cases.191 In the only decision that came before Washington 
State Grange and Crawford, the Sixth Circuit invalidated an Ohio statute 
that mandated petition circulators to be paid only on a per-time basis, as 
opposed to per signature.192 Although the court did not say so explicitly, 
its opinion reads as if the law was unconstitutional on its face.193 The 
five cases that came after Washington State Grange and Crawford 
present more of a mixed bag. Notably, none of these cases cited 
Washington State Grange or Crawford. In many of them, the courts 
were careful either to clarify that the laws were invalid only as applied 
or to emphasize that a successful facial challenge was “‘strong medicine 
to be applied sparingly and only as a last resort.’”194 
As another example of a court’s reluctance to strike down a law in 
its entirety after Washington State Grange and Crawford, consider the 
Second Circuit’s approach in Price v. New York State Board of 
Elections.195 The court ruled that New York’s failure to allow the voters 
in question to vote absentee in the election for political party county 
committee, even though the voters qualified for absentee ballots under 
New York law for other elections, improperly burdened the voters’ First 
                                                          
 190. Id. at 420 (“We think the burdens imposed on plaintiffs’ associational rights are severe.”); 
see also id. at 421 (stating that “it does not appear that the challenged statutory provision is 
necessary to achieve the state’s asserted interest”). 
 191. See app. tbl.4, supra note 167. 
 192. Citizens for Tax Reform v. Deters, 518 F.3d 375, 377 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 193. See id. (“The provision, however, runs afoul of the First Amendment because it creates a 
significant burden on a core political speech right that is not narrowly tailored.”). 
 194. N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
Seniors Ass’n v. Social Sec. Admin., 423 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 195. 540 F.3d 101, 112 (2d Cir. 2008). 
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Amendment rights.196 Although the court did not cite either Washington 
State Grange or Crawford, it took pains to emphasize that its holding 
applied only to these voters, suggesting that the law might not 
impermissibly burden other voters in other circumstances.197 
However, even in light of Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
at least one court was willing to strike down a particular election practice 
with little regard for whether the plaintiff challenged the statute on its 
face or as applied. In Nader v. Brewer,198 the Ninth Circuit invalidated 
Arizona laws that required circulators of presidential nomination 
petitions to be residents of the state and nomination petitions to be filed 
at least ninety days before the primary election.199 The court stated that 
these requirements severely burdened the rights of candidates and those 
supporting them who were not from Arizona, and could not withstand 
strict scrutiny review.200 Although seemingly outside of the “as-applied 
only” rule of Washington State Grange and Crawford, this case actually 
demonstrates how many laws simply are not amenable solely to a facial 
or as-applied challenge and exemplifies how the distinction is often 
blurred.201 Ralph Nader and many of his supporters were not from 
Arizona, and the statute in question required petition circulators to be 
from Arizona.202 A ruling that the statute was unconstitutional as applied 
to Ralph Nader meant that it was unconstitutional as applied to anyone 
not from Arizona. As the statute affected only non-residents, there was 
no possible way for the state to enforce its law against anyone other than 
those similarly situated to Nader.203 It follows that for Nader to succeed, 
the court would have to hold the law unconstitutional in every 
application. In this instance, there was no neat separation between as-
applied and facial challenges. The Court’s declarations in Washington 
State Grange and Crawford about as-applied challenges to election laws 
were largely irrelevant when applied to facts such as those in Nader. 
This case also shows that the type of case matters. A court facing a facial 
challenge to a voter identification law after Crawford most certainly will 
                                                          
 196. Id. at 103-04. 
 197. Id. at 112; see also supra note 126. 
 198. 531 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 199. Id. at 1030-31. 
 200. Id. at 1040. 
 201. See generally Fallon, supra note 14 (discussing how there is no neat way to separate facial 
from as-applied challenges). 
 202. Nader, 531 F.3d at 1030, 1032. 
 203. Id. at 1031; see also Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459, 475 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that 
the Ohio Secretary of State “violated Nader’s First Amendment rights when he enforced Ohio’s 
registration and residency requirements against Nader’s candidate-petition circulators”). 
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reject that challenge in favor of an as-applied approach, but the rule 
might not be as clear to lower courts for other types of cases. 
None of this analysis presents a perfect measure of whether the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Washington State Grange or Crawford 
fundamentally altered the landscape of election law jurisprudence. The 
statistical analysis shows only a minor shift; the description of the cases 
reveals that some cases might have gone the other way. At most, we can 
conclude that the courts of appeals are being particularly careful to limit 
the scope of their rulings in election law decisions. The cases suggest 
that it has become harder to bring a successful facial challenge to an 
election regulation. Thus, what we see is a gradual change, whereby 
governments are able to try out various election regimes with minimal 
court interference. In the process, political actors such as voters, 
candidates, or political parties have a harder time vindicating their rights. 
That is, recent decisions in the courts of appeals show that judges have 
swung the pendulum even further in favor of a governmental entity’s 
election scheme by narrowing the manner in which a plaintiff can 
challenge an election law. The Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Washington State Grange and Crawford provide a cogent explanation 
for this recent narrowing of voters’ and others’ rights. 
2. District Courts 
District courts rendered many more election law decisions than the 
courts of appeals during these time periods; thus, a comparison of the 
decisions in 2004 and 2008 provides further insight into whether voters 
or other political actors are finding it more difficult to vindicate their 
rights or obtain broad relief. 
To determine if there has been a discernable shift after Washington 
State Grange and Crawford, I catalogued every reported district court 
decision from both 2004 and 2008 that ruled upon the legality of a 
government’s election law practice.204 The plaintiffs in these cases were 
                                                          
 204. See app. tbls.5 & 6, supra note 163. I analyzed only cases that ruled one way or the other 
on whether the government had acted unlawfully. Therefore, I did not include election law cases in 
which the court addressed procedural matters or dismissed for a non-merit based reason, such as 
lack of standing. See, e.g., Molinari v. Bloomberg, No. CV-08-4539, 2008 WL 5233854, *11 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2008) (denying motion to transfer venue); Sajo v. Bradbury, No. CV 04-853, 
2004 WL 1803324, *1 (D. Or. Aug. 12, 2004) (dismissing case as moot). Additionally, I included 
cases in which the plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, as many election law cases fall under 
this rubric, often not going beyond this stage. In a case involving a request for a preliminary 
injunction, the court does not render a final decision on the constitutionality of the government’s 
action, but it does make an initial determination of whether the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the 
merits. See John Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions: In Defense of the Merits, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 33, 35 (2007) (noting that “the strength of the plaintiff’s case under the substantive law—
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voters, voting advocacy groups, candidates, political parties, and other 
entities that sought to challenge a state or federal government election 
regulation.205 The challenges ranged from questioning a state’s ballot 
access law to campaign finance disputes to Voting Rights Act litigation. 
Thus, the analysis of district court adjudication of these disputes paints a 
fairly broad picture of the state of election law for 2004 and 2008, the 
last two presidential election years. 
In 2004, federal district courts determined the validity of a local, 
state, or federal government election action in seventy-seven cases.206 
The courts struck down at least part of a state’s election law practice 
thirty-one times, ruling entirely in favor of the government in the 
remaining forty-six cases.207 That is, the state’s success rate in having its 
election law decision upheld in its entirety was approximately 59.7%.208 
For comparison to 2008, when confining the time period to March 18, 
2004 (the date in 2008 of the Washington State Grange decision) to the 
end of 2004, the district courts struck down an election law at least in 
part twenty-seven times and ruled entirely for the state in thirty-eight 
cases, giving the state a 58.4% success rate during this period.209  
In 2008, federal district courts rendered eighty-six decisions that 
considered whether the governmental entity in question had gone too far 
in its election regime.210 The court upheld the government’s practice in 
its entirety fifty-four times and granted at least some relief thirty-two 
times.211 Thus, the governmental entity had a success rate of 
approximately 62.3% for all of 2008.212 After Washington State Grange, 
district courts struck down at least part of an election law in twenty-eight 
cases and upheld the law in its entirety forty-one times, giving the state a 
59.4% success rate during this time period.213 In several of the cases in 
                                                          
usually referred to as the plaintiff’s likelihood of prevailing—is an important, perhaps the most 
important, factor in determining whether the plaintiff can obtain preliminary relief”). Therefore, 
suits seeking injunctive relief provide an indication regarding whether the government’s election 
regime is lawful. They are thus appropriate to include in a discussion of whether courts have looked 
more favorably upon the current governmental practice in an election law case. 
 205. In several cases, the plaintiff was the United States, bringing Voting Rights Act claims 
against covered jurisdictions. See, e.g., United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06 Civ. 15173, 
2008 WL 190502, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2008); United States v. Alamosa County, 306 F. Supp. 
2d 1016, 1017-18 (D. Colo. 2004). 
 206. See app. tbl.5, supra note 163. 
 207. See app. tbl.5, supra note 163. 
 208. See app. tbl.5, supra note 163. 
 209. See app. tbl.5, supra note 163. 
 210. See app. tbl.6, supra note 163. 
 211. See app. tbl.6, supra note 163.  
 212. See app. tbl.6, supra note 163. 
 213. See app. tbl.6, supra note 163. 
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which the plaintiffs won, the relief was through as-applied, not facial, 
challenges.214 In at least one case, the court rejected a facial challenge by 
using the principles from Washington State Grange and Crawford 
without actually citing those decisions, showing how lower courts have 
mimicked the Supreme Court’s attitude toward facial challenges even if 
the district courts did not directly cite these cases.215 
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Table 3: Federal District Courts Invalidation of Election Laws, 2004 
and 2008 
Although the numbers are almost identical, the cases reveal more 
than the raw data may indicate. Combined with the discussion of the 
decisions that cite Washington State Grange and Crawford for the as-
applied rule, this analysis suggests that plaintiffs may now have a harder 
time achieving broad relief in an election law case. Of course, this trend 
                                                          
 214. See, e.g., Ohio Right to Life Soc’y v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, Case No. 2:08-cv-00492, 
2008 WL 4186312, at *11-12 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2008); Citizens for Police Accountability Political 
Comm. v. Browning, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1172-74 (M.D. Fla. 2008). But see Nat’l Right to Work 
Legal Def. & Educ. Found., Inc. v. Herbert, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1154-55 (D. Utah 2008) (striking 
down a campaign finance law both on its face and as-applied). 
 215. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, No. 3:08-CV-483, 2008 WL 
4416282, at *7-8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2008). 
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may stem from a number of factors, and the sample size may not be 
large enough to draw definitive conclusions. Regardless, although there 
has not been a major shift, the consequences of Washington State 
Grange and Crawford are not unnoticeable. For example, even if 
plaintiffs secure a ruling that the government’s action is unlawful, that 
relief is likely to be narrower because courts are constrained from ruling 
upon the facial validity of a law.216 That is, the almost identical numbers 
of district court decisions in 2004 and 2008 do not take into account the 
type of relief currently available to plaintiffs, which the as-applied only 
rule from Washington State Grange and Crawford circumscribes. 
Additionally, it is impossible to measure how many cases were never 
filed as a result of potential plaintiffs’ apprehension about the as-applied 
approach in Washington State Grange and Crawford. This data therefore 
underrepresents the potential effect of these decisions. Nevertheless, 
given what we know about the shifting paradigm from Washington State 
Grange and Crawford, one eminently logical conclusion is that the 
federal courts have taken the cue that states should be freer to conduct 
their elections as they see fit. In short, stemming from Washington State 
Grange and Crawford, there is a general sentiment in the federal courts 
to construe election law statutes narrowly and in the government’s favor. 
Here is the upshot: When lower courts cite Washington State 
Grange, and to a lesser extent, Crawford, they are likely to do so for the 
proposition that plaintiffs must limit election law challenges to as-
applied suits. This comports with the Roberts Court’s general disfavor 
for facial challenges to all sorts of statutes.217 At the same time, voters 
are finding it slightly more difficult to challenge a state’s election 
regulation, particularly in the federal courts of appeals, beyond perhaps 
achieving minor narrow victories for a specific application. This, in turn, 
affects who chooses to bring suit, as those who believe they will secure 
only modest relief are unlikely to endure the hassles of a lawsuit.218 
Whether there is a direct causation or a mere correlation between these 
Supreme Court cases and the general trend in election law jurisprudence 
is not yet clear. In any event, there is an observable, albeit gradual and 
minor, trend toward making it more difficult for voters to win lawsuits 
                                                          
 216. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
 217. See, e.g., Caitlin E. Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable 
Through Facial Challenges, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 563, 573-90 (2009); David L. Franklin, 
Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689, 694-95 (2009). 
 218. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1645 (noting that voting advocacy groups may 
be less likely to spend the time and money to challenge an election law if they are likely to achieve 
only narrow and specific success). 
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that broadly challenge a state’s election regime. Thus, instead of a sea 
change in election law, Washington State Grange and Crawford 
represent a modest—yet still alarming—movement. Judges, who 
determine the scope of the right to vote, have used the procedural hurdle 
of rejecting facial challenges to tip the scale in favor of the state, making 
it more difficult to broadly challenge a governmental entity’s election 
law practice. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE TREND TOWARD ALLOWING ONLY  
AS-APPLIED ADJUDICATION 
The preceding analysis underscores the main thesis of my 
scholarship: The meaning of the “right to vote” is wholly dependent on 
how Supreme Court Justices, and as a corollary, lower federal judges, 
define that right.219 During every election cycle, federal judges confront 
myriad election-related cases. The manner in which the judges construe 
those challenged laws provides guidance on the scope of protection for 
the right to vote.220 Thus, in the 1960s, Supreme Court Justices sought to 
widely protect the right to vote; this era was the peak of judicial 
protection of the franchise.221 The current Court, by contrast, has 
provided less protection to an individual’s right to vote, tipping the 
balance toward the states in regulating their elections. My research 
demonstrates one manner in which the Justices have done so: through 
limiting challenges to a state’s election regime to only as-applied 
litigation. 
This analysis leads to two conclusions. First, judges have 
tremendous power in shaping democratic principles, and, by extension, 
the meaning of our system of self-governance. Second, the Court’s 
current focus on as-applied challenges should cause some apprehension 
about the role of the Court in election law disputes. As I further examine 
in Part V, given these practical concerns stemming from the approach in 
                                                          
 219. See generally Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143 (2009) (questioning the fundamentality of the “right to vote” in the face of 
conflicting adjudicatory standards) [hereinafter Douglas, Right to Vote]; Joshua A. Douglas, Note, A 
Vote for Clarity: Updating the Supreme Court’s Severe Burden Test for State Election Regulations 
That Adversely Impact an Individual’s Right to Vote, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 372 (2007) (assessing 
the “severe burden test” in light of cases stemming from the 2004 presidential election). 
 220. Professor Metzger explains that the impact of the Roberts Court’s focus on as-applied 
litigation generally depends on the content of the substantive constitutional doctrine involved. 
Metzger, supra note 118. As I show, given the power of the Justices in defining political rights, the 
facial/as-applied distinction in the election law context has a direct impact on the meaning of the 
right to vote. 
 221. See supra Part II.B.  
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Washington State Grange and Crawford, the Supreme Court should 
abolish the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges and 
instead adopt the overbreadth doctrine for election law cases. 
A. The Role of Judges in Shaping Democratic Self-Governance 
One underlying theme of the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Washington State Grange and Crawford is that judges have tremendous 
power in defining the meaning of political participation. Professors 
Elmendorf and Foley recently provided a theoretical backbone to my 
theory that judges are uniquely responsible for shaping the right to 
vote.222 These professors considered the Court’s varying analytical 
approaches to election law cases during the 2007 Term223 and concluded 
that the Justices generally are more concerned with the practical 
implications of their decisions than with having a consistent and 
coherent approach.224 As Professor Elmendorf and Professor Foley 
write, 
Our tentative view is that this methodological pluralism, coupled with 
a lack of explicit normative direction, tends to suggest that most 
Justices (even Scalia) approach constitutional election law thinking 
less about doctrinal coherence or interpretive principle than about the 
implications of their rulings for the system of government as a whole. 
The Justices sense that constitutional adjudication has an important 
role to play in legitimating the ground rules of electoral competition, 
notwithstanding that the text of the Constitution and conventional 
historical sources do very little to define the scope of political rights.225 
Thus, the Justices are mostly concerned with the practical effects of 
their election law decisions. This comports with my notion that the 
Justices shape the meaning of the right to vote through their largely ad 
hoc approach to election law cases.226 That is, the “right to vote” is not 
an abstract, amorphous concept or a well-defined, consistent principle; 
instead, it is simply whatever the current Supreme Court Justices say it 
is. 
By rejecting virtually all facial challenges, the Court has signaled 
that most election laws probably pass muster for at least one election 
                                                          
 222. See Elmendorf & Foley, supra note 107, at 537. 
 223. Id. at 517-29. 
 224. Id. at 537. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See sources cited supra note 217. 
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cycle.227 In essence, the default is that a particular regulation will impose 
no constitutionally-suspect burden on voters or other political actors.228 
The Court starts out with the foundation that the state has promulgated a 
constitutional election scheme, making it virtually impossible to imagine 
an election law that the Court would strike down on its face before it can 
see how the law actually works in practice.229 The rights of political 
actors, particular voters, candidates, or minor political parties become 
derogated in the process, because they are unable to vindicate their rights 
until they can provide concrete and specific evidence on the actual effect 
of the law.230 
Currently, the Justices believe that when the right to vote abuts the 
power of the state, the state should usually win.231 The byproduct is a 
derogation of protection for actors in the political process. The Court has 
sent the signal that states have almost unfettered discretion in regulating 
their elections. Any relief voters or others achieve will likely be at the 
margins and narrow in scope through piecemeal as-applied litigation. 
Further, as one commentator noted, the reality of this approach is that 
voters might never achieve relief because, even though the Court left 
open the possibility of as-applied challenges in theory, voters will be 
unlikely to succeed in practice.232 In Washington State Grange and 
                                                          
 227. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1666-67 (noting that “[t]he effect of the Court’s 
decision [in Washington State Grange] is to force plaintiffs to suffer irreparable harm (in this case, 
confused voters in an election) in order to generate evidence as to the law’s unconstitutionality”); 
see also Metzger, supra note 118; Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1666 (noting that the effect 
of the push to as-applied challenges in election law is to make some voting rights claims more 
difficult to bring). 
 228. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 322 (2007) (arguing that “scrutiny levels 
[in election law cases] depend on presumptive, first-pass determinations regarding the constitutional 
status (permissible or impermissible) of the challenged law”). 
 229. Chief Justice Roberts attempted to refute this notion in his concurrence in Washington 
State Grange, stating that the ballot design itself—which a political party could challenge before the 
election—would be the dispositive point. See Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 
128 S. Ct. 1184, 1197 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 230. Of course, there may also be a positive practical effect of this default rule, as it gives 
election administrators wide leeway in trying out new voting technologies. See Daniel P. Tokaji, 
The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1711, 1716 
(2005) (“[Mandating a uniform voting technology] can also be expected to stifle innovation by 
locking in a particular type of security enhancement, while discouraging other possibilities that may 
be more effective and easier to implement.”). Thus, a particular election mechanism may burden 
voters in the first instance, but the by-product is that governments may innovate in how they run 
elections. 
 231. See Persily, supra note 7, at 109 (noting the general restraint the Roberts Court has 
exercised over election laws, with the exception of campaign finance regulations). 
 232. See Vikram David Amar, What the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision Upholding 
Indiana’s Voter ID Law Tells Us About the Court, Beyond the Area of Election Law, FINDLAW, 
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Crawford, the Court sent this veiled message through the lens of 
rejecting facial challenges. The Justices currently in the majority—most 
often the conservative members of the Court—provided protection to 
states’ election regimes through a judicial gloss on the types of lawsuits 
political actors can bring to vindicate their rights. Lower courts, sensing 
this message, began to follow suit and more often ruled for the state in 
an election challenge. The change is gradual, as we see from the effects 
of Washington State Grange and Crawford, but this does not diminish 
its importance. In short, the facial/as-applied dichotomy says a lot about 
how the protection for the right to vote depends on the way in which 
judges use judicial rules to shape election law litigation. 
This conclusion holds true for various aspects of election law, from 
requiring voters to show photo identification to regulating political 
parties to having onerous voter registration rules. Professor Tokaji noted 
that if lower courts follow the Supreme Court’s recent “high bar for 
plaintiffs seeking to mount . . . facial challenge[s],” voters will have a 
very difficult time obtaining pre-election relief when challenging a 
restriction on registration.233 This is because any relief is possible only 
after voters suffer a violation of their constitutional rights during an 
election and then can demonstrate the effect of the law as applied to 
them. The upshot is that states have much greater power in regulating 
their elections, which can lead to partisan election officials skewing the 
state’s rules in their favor.234 
Persily and Rosenberg recently provided an explanation for the 
Court’s strict adherence to as-applied litigation for election law that 
focuses directly on the process of judicial decision-making on the 
Supreme Court.235 They argue that the trend toward as-applied 
adjudication is consistent with an under-the-surface mechanism to 
constrain unfavorable precedent and rework statutory meaning.236 For 
example, Persily and Rosenberg suggest that in Federal Election 
                                                          
May 8, 2008, http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/amar/20080508.html (noting that the practical reality of the 
Court’s decision in Crawford is that “for some claims and right-holders, it’s facial challenge or bust. 
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 233. Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
453, 489-90 (2008). 
 234. See id. at 491 (“To the extent courts deny standing to plaintiffs in these cases or restrict 
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 235. See generally Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7. 
 236. Id. 
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Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (“WRTL”),237 the Court ruled 
almost all activity under the campaign finance statute unconstitutional as 
applied so as to work around a previous decision rejecting a facial 
challenge,238 thereby “carv[ing out] an exception to the law that is as 
large as the legislative record justifying it.”239 Persily also contends that 
the as-applied approach helped to build consensus for the majority ruling 
in both Washington State Grange and Crawford, as the Justices who 
were “on the fence” felt that they could condone an opinion that left the 
door open to future challenges.240 
Persily and Rosenberg’s analysis shows how the facial/as-applied 
debate affects the internal decision-making in these cases.241 What the 
Justices fail to explicitly acknowledge (or perhaps even realize) is that 
these rules have stark practical effects on the political process. For 
example, in Crawford, Justice Stevens might have believed that a 
decision rejecting facial challenges to voter identification laws but 
allowing future as-applied litigation was an appropriate compromise 
given the approach of his conservative colleagues.242 Taking this more 
incrementalist strategy would produce a far more palatable outcome than 
a starker opinion denying all possible relief, as Justice Scalia advocated 
in his Crawford concurrence.243 That is, Justice Stevens might have 
believed that writing the controlling opinion so as to leave the door open 
to as-applied litigation was a better strategy than being in the dissent to 
an opinion that rejected all possible challenges to a voter identification 
law. But as a result of the Crawford majority, lower courts seem to be 
narrowing their decisions and ruling in favor of the state more often 
because of the signals the Supreme Court has sent. Thus, if Justice 
                                                          
 237. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 238. Compare id. at 2659, with McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 157 n.52 
(2003). McConnell had left the door open to an as-applied challenge to the law. See McConnell, 540 
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 239. Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1661. Persily and Rosenberg note that in this way, 
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Stevens’s ruling was an attempt to cabin a harsher result for the rights of 
voters, his strategy may have backfired through the lower courts’ 
application of these rules. In this way, the rejection of all facial 
challenges has created unintended negative consequences stemming 
directly from the power that the Supreme Court has in shaping political 
rights. If anything, the effects of Washington State Grange and 
Crawford show that the Court is not a passive bystander but rather is the 
institution with the most power to define the scope of the right to vote, 
even if the rules it promulgates can be understood as a means of internal 
decision-making. 
Thus, the decisions in Washington State Grange and Crawford 
represent a gradual trend of today’s Supreme Court Justices toward 
narrow judicial protection for those who seek to challenge a state 
election regulation. The Court did not say so explicitly in these 
decisions, but by closing the door to virtually all facial challenges, the 
Court is placing a high burden on voters and others who seek to 
vindicate their rights. This burden is in stark contrast to the rules of the 
1960s, when the Supreme Court allowed facial challenges to election 
laws and thereby encouraged sweeping electoral change. Unpacking 
these trends leads to a realization that individual Justices have immense 
power in defining the most basic right in our democracy. 
Recognizing the power of individual Justices and judges to shape 
the right to vote also leads to further lessons for the study of election 
law. Scholars should remain intensely attuned to the unintended and 
unstated consequences of Supreme Court decisions in this area because 
they have significant repercussions for the functioning of our 
democracy. This analysis allows us to divorce ourselves from attempting 
to glean an overarching principle for all election law jurisprudence, 
instead requiring us to focus on the idiosyncrasies of the individual 
Justices and their approaches to these cases. The effects of Washington 
State Grange and Crawford show that what the Justices say actually 
matters a great deal to the current scope of political rights. It also signals 
that the make-up of the Supreme Court has a huge impact on the scope 
of the right to vote: The right to vote is simply whatever the nine current 
Supreme Court Justices say it is. The everyday rules of election law are 
not usually contentious topics during a prospective Justice’s nomination 
hearing;244 realizing that the Court is actually the most significant arbiter 
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States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. 170-173 (2005) (questioning from Senator 
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in shaping political rights suggests that we should scrutinize nominees 
more closely on this topic. In sum, Washington State Grange and 
Crawford represent an important but often overlooked trend: Justices 
and judges have great power in shaping political rights through 
“everyday” rulings in election law cases. 
B. A Cause for Concern 
For those who believe that election law should be mostly about 
vindicating group rights and ensuring that leaders do not become 
entrenched, this shift toward allowing only as-applied challenges—and 
the accompanying trend toward upholding state election regulations—
should cause immense concern. Structuralists generally believe that the 
role of the courts is to safeguard against partisan leaders using the 
political process to entrench themselves in the majority.245 As Professor 
Pamela Karlan observes, the Supreme Court “deploys the Equal 
Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable group of 
individuals . . . but rather to regulate the institutional arrangements 
                                                          
Kennedy); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109 Cong. 
380 (2006) [hereinafter Confirmation Hearings of Alito] (questioning from Senator Kohl). No 
Senator pressed either nominee on more core values regarding the meaning of the right to vote or 
the role judges should play in shaping a state’s powers in managing an election. Although some 
committee members questioned Roberts on the Voting Rights Act, the most robust discussion of 
election law during Justice Alito’s confirmation hearing occurred when Professor Samuel 
Issacharoff testified before the committee on the principles underlying the “one person-one vote” 
rule, advising the Senate that it should assure itself that any Supreme Court nominee would “assume 
the full responsibility of protecting the integrity of our democratic processes.” Confirmation 
Hearings of Alito, supra, at 689. 
 245. See Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the 
Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 510, 523 (2004) (arguing that an individualistic 
perspective makes little sense because the Court is required to make value judgments about how to 
structure a democratic election and in the process decide important structural issues such as the role 
of political parties, the power of minority groups, or the appropriate amount of competition); 
Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the Democratic 
Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 (1998) (“Where there is an appropriately robust market in 
partisan competition, there is less justification for judicial intervention. Where courts can discern 
that existing partisan forces have manipulated these background rules, courts should strike down 
those manipulations in order to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan environment.”); 
Richard H. Pildes, Competitive, Deliberative, and Rights-Oriented Democracy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 
685, 688 (2004) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)) 
(stating that “of the various structural goals of democracy, the one courts ought to focus on is 
ensuring competition and, through it, electoral accountability”); Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are 
Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 
731 (1998). 
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within which politics is conducted.”246 Under this view, the role of the 
judiciary is to regulate the proper relationship between political 
institutions and to limit the exercise of state power when used to achieve 
anti-competitive ends.247 
The Court’s practice in Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
however, was to rubberstamp a state’s electoral scheme, at least for one 
election, until a voter or political party can gather enough evidence on 
how the law actually operates in the context of a real election. This 
provides a great incentive for state officials—who are traditionally self-
interested by virtue of election to their positions—to shape the rules of 
the game to benefit their political persuasion.248 Thus, not only is the 
Court under-protecting those who challenge the state’s actions, it is also 
failing to ensure that those in power do not use that power for unfair 
means. 
It may not seem like much when the Court states that “facial 
challenges are best when infrequent.”249 When the Court applied this 
rule to election law, however, it signaled that the balance of power 
tipped heavily toward the state in managing an election, impacting the 
meaning of self-governance. Lower courts take notice, and even if they 
do not specifically cite this rule, they are more likely to reject a 
plaintiff’s argument in an election law case. In the process, the Court 
fails to achieve the structuralist ideal of warding off entrenchment. 
Moreover, based upon this seemingly procedural rule of rejecting 
facial challenges, the current Court has effectively said that the scope of 
the right to vote is quite narrow. If the Court continues down this path, 
                                                          
 246. See Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal Protection 
from Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1345, 1346 (2001). 
 247. See Issacharaoff & Pildes, supra note 245, at 717-18. 
 248. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD H. PILDES, LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY 64 (rev. 2d ed. & Supp. 2005) (highlighting “the always present risk that election 
regulations enacted by self-interested legislatures can be a vehicle for incumbent or partisan 
protection”); Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disenfranchisement, 
and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1248 (2005) (suggesting that, in the 
absence of “clear [state] rules,” local election administrators may apply rules that benefit their 
preferred candidate or hurt the candidates they oppose); Recent Case, Seventh Circuit Upholds 
Voter ID Statute, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1984 (2007) (noting that simply deferring to legislatures 
in a voter identification case is “an especially worrisome choice given the concern that election 
regulations may be passed to entrench the very legislators creating them”); see also Clingman v. 
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 603 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“Although the State has a legitimate—and indeed critical—role to play in regulating elections, it 
must be recognized that it is not a wholly independent or neutral arbiter. Rather, the State is itself 
controlled by the political party or parties in power, which presumably have an incentive to shape 
the rules of the electoral game to their own benefit.”). 
 249. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004). 
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we can expect to see it rejecting many more challenges to state election 
regimes, and states likely will continue to impose obstacles to political 
participation. The stated reasons for imposing these burdens might be to 
enhance efficiency or ward off election fraud, but partisan election 
officials also can use their electoral schemes to shape the rules of the 
game—with little concern for court interference. When a voter, 
candidate, or political party does obtain relief, that relief is likely to have 
little impact on voting rights as a whole; a court is much more likely to 
uphold a law on its face but strike down the state’s specific application 
of the law to that plaintiff. The voter or candidate might have his or her 
rights vindicated for that election, but the state can still apply the law to 
others or tweak it to carve out the unconstitutional portion. Under this 
approach, the Court’s decisions are unlikely to initiate wholesale 
changes in how states run their elections. 
This all comes at the expense of those who burdensome laws are 
most likely to adversely affect: minority voters, third-party candidates, 
and minor political parties. Due to their place in the minority, they are 
already disadvantaged in the electoral system. If they were in the 
majority, theoretically they could shape the rules of the game through 
electoral procedures—which courts are now less likely to curtail. 
Instead, they must resort to the judiciary to vindicate their rights. But 
they might not find success there, as the Supreme Court has narrowed 
the ability of these political actors to challenge a state’s election rules. 
The effects of the “as-applied only” rule of Washington State 
Grange and Crawford are in their infancy. The data of lower federal 
court decisions suggests that there is a slight, yet still perceptible, trend 
toward more easily upholding a state’s election scheme.250 The concern 
is that as states realize the implications of Washington State Grange and 
Crawford, they might try to become even more innovative in 
promulgating election regulations that will entrench the majority. Those 
adversely affected—minority voters and candidates—will bear a greater 
burden in challenging these regulations. Thus, although the data 
comparing 2004 and 2008 do not show a large change, if the trend 
continues, it seems likely that the pendulum will swing even further 
toward the state during the next election cycle. The Supreme Court in 
Washington State Grange and Crawford was the catalyst for this shift. 
The by-product is a failure to achieve structuralist goals or ward off 
entrenchment, underscoring once again the power of Supreme Court 
Justices in defining what it means to have a “right to vote.” 
                                                          
 250. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text.  
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V. ABOLISHING THE FACIAL/AS-APPLIED DISTINCTION  
FOR ELECTION LAW CASES AND ADOPTING THE  
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE IN ITS PLACE 
Acknowledging that Justices and judges have a particularly unique 
role in defining the right to vote and recognizing that recent decisions 
have in effect curtailed that right leads to the conclusion that courts 
should relax the procedural-type requirements for this area of law. 
Courts must be ever vigilant to ensure that states are not infringing upon 
the right to vote, given that courts shape democratic principles. Because 
voting is so important to our notion of self-governance, there is reason 
for added judicial scrutiny of election laws. Requiring as-applied 
challenges mutes this scrutiny because it allows governmental entities to 
promulgate laws that will be in effect until a plaintiff can show the 
actual consequences of the law, which is usually possible only after at 
least one election under that regulation. As a result, voters and others 
may suffer an infringement of their rights. 
My research shows the practical and adverse effects of the Court’s 
recent approach in Washington State Grange and Crawford.251 Persily 
and Rosenberg opine that the Court should relax the standard for facial 
challenges with the goal of facilitating clarity, acknowledging the 
irreparability of an injury that often occurs, and keeping in mind the 
costs to the individual when bringing a suit.252 They suggest that courts 
should prefer facial challenges to as-applied challenges in election law 
and advocate “something akin to ‘substantial overbreadth’” in the 
election law context.253 It was beyond the scope of their article, however, 
to describe in detail how a new overbreadth-type test might work. At a 
general level, they suggest that any remedy must include a greater ability 
for political actors to gain prospective relief so that they need not wait 
until a state actually implements an onerous election regulation to 
challenge that law.254 
My solution is more drastic: The Court should eradicate any 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges for election law.255 
                                                          
 251. See supra Part IV.  
 252. Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1672-73. 
 253. Id. at 1674. 
 254. See id. at 1672-74. 
 255. But see United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “it is 
hard to believe the Court would ever eliminate as-applied challenges for one particular area of 
constitutional law”), vacated and remanded by United States v. Stewart, 545 U.S. 1112 (2005). 
Professor Fallon suggests that although courts almost always require as-applied challenges, the 
practical effect of the courts’ decisions is to invalidate a law in its entirety. See Fallon, supra note 
14, at 1327-28 (“In order to raise a constitutional objection to a statute, a litigant must always assert 
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The lens of facial or as-applied challenges has few practical advantages 
for election law cases; it does not assist courts in more easily disposing 
of election-related disputes or reduce election litigation. Instead, it 
makes it harder to glean clear rules about what types of electoral 
schemes are permissible and, practically speaking, forbids voters from 
achieving pre-election prospective relief. Accordingly, courts should 
simply determine whether a state’s election practice—given the facts 
before the court—is permissible. 
The Supreme Court has disfavored facial challenges for several 
reasons. First, “claims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation.”256 
Second,  
Facial challenges also run contrary to the fundamental principle of 
judicial restraint that courts should neither anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it nor 
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the 
precise facts to which it is to be applied.257  
Finally, “facial challenges threaten to short circuit the democratic 
process by preventing laws embodying the will of the people from being 
implemented in a manner consistent with the Constitution.”258 
The importance of protecting the right to vote and encouraging 
political participation tempers these concerns in the election law context. 
If a plaintiff with standing is able to show that a law that affects voting 
rights is invalid with respect to either him- or herself or some other 
political actor, then there is no reason for the court to rubberstamp the 
law or pass on deciding its constitutionality. As Justice Scalia noted in 
his concurrence in Crawford, “[t]his is an area where the dos and don’ts 
need to be known in advance of the election.”259 
                                                          
that the statute’s application to her case violates the Constitution. But when holding that a statute 
cannot be enforced against a particular litigant, a court will typically apply a general norm or test 
and, in doing so, may engage in reasoning that marks the statute as unenforceable in its totality. In a 
practical sense, doctrinal tests of constitutional validity can thus produce what are effectively facial 
challenges. Nonetheless, determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as 
logical outgrowths of rulings on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular 
facts.”); see also David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges, Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce 
Clause, 92 IOWA L. REV. 41 (2006) (examining the trend toward allowing only facial challenges for 
Commerce Clause cases); Nathaniel Stewart, Note, Turning the Commerce Clause Challenge “On 
Its Face”: Why Federal Commerce Clause Statutes Demand Facial Challenges, 55 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 161 (2004) (same). 
 256. Wash. State Grange. v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1191 (2008). 
 257. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 258. Id. 
 259. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1626 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). Of course, Justice Scalia made this statement in conjunction with his 
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Therefore, the Court should abolish the facial/as-applied distinction 
for these cases and, in its place, incorporate the First Amendment 
overbreadth doctrine into election law.260 The overbreadth doctrine 
allows a court to vindicate others’ rights when the right is important 
enough to enjoy widespread and special protection. Facial overbreadth 
applies to speech because of the importance of free speech to our 
democracy.261 A law is overbroad if it “does not aim specifically at evils 
within the allowable area of state control but, on the contrary, sweeps 
within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute 
an exercise of freedom of speech or of the press.”262 The Court has 
determined that protecting speech is so vital that we should allow a 
plaintiff to vindicate the free speech rights of others. The overbreadth 
doctrine also helps to ensure that laws will not have a chilling effect on 
expressive conduct.263 
The right to vote, which is at the core of the political process, 
should similarly receive this special kind of protection. Self-governance 
begins at the voting booth; all citizens have a stake in ensuring that our 
democracy functions fairly. Given the importance of voting, we should 
be extremely concerned about the chilling effect of a law that suppresses 
political participation. For example, a person who might be exempted 
from showing a photo identification based upon the Court’s reasoning in 
Crawford might choose not to go to the voting booth because he or she 
incorrectly believes that the law validly applies to all voters. The Court 
should not allow a state to infringe upon the rights of some voters simply 
because those voters have not brought suit; instead, the Court should 
determine which applications are permissible and strike down those 
applications that are unconstitutional. It follows that a plaintiff should be 
able to bring suit to vindicate all voters’ rights to protect the foundation 
of the political process. That is, given the unique importance of the right 
to vote, courts should decide election law disputes without the guise of 
the facial or as-applied approach and instead should invoke the 
                                                          
argument that the Court should reject all challenges to the voter identification law and hold that it 
never can be invalid as applied. See id. 
 260. See Gans, supra note 13, at 1342-43, 1361 (“Courts . . . need not wait for the statute’s first 
application to constitutionally protected speech to determine its facial validity. Courts will enjoin an 
overbroad law at the behest of the first challenger.”); see also Decker, supra note 45, at 81-82 
(suggesting that the Court implicitly used the overbreadth doctrine in at least one case involving the 
right to vote: Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965)); id. at 103-04 (advocating for the 
Court to adopt the overbreadth doctrine for all fundamental rights). 
 261. See Dorf, supra note 14, at 261-62.  
 262. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940). 
 263. See id.; see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 (1992) (White, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
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overbreadth doctrine. As Professor Dorf explained, “the First 
Amendment is not alone in preserving an open democratic political 
regime.”264 
An overbreadth doctrine for election law is not unprecedented. The 
Supreme Court implicitly invalidated the poll tax at issue in Harper v. 
Virginia Board of Elections by using an overbreadth analysis.265 That is, 
the Court struck down the law without inquiring into whether the 
plaintiffs themselves were able to pay the tax.266 As Professor Dorf 
observes, “[t]he Harper Court thereby implicitly extended overbreadth 
analysis to a non-First Amendment, nonlitigation right.”267  
Similarly, in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia,268 Justice 
Scalia argued in dissent that requiring a political party to “preclear” a 
change in the way it selected its nominees was an overbroad application 
of the Voting Rights Act.269 Instead of refusing to pass upon 
“hypothetical” situations, Justice Scalia asserted that the Court should 
determine whether applying Section Five of the Voting Rights Act to 
political parties infringed upon the right to freedom of association in a 
substantial number of other contexts not necessarily before the Court.270 
Justice Scalia also has suggested overbreadth analysis for campaign 
finance regulations because those laws implicate First Amendment 
associative rights.271  
Of course, Justice Scalia’s “facial” approach to election laws is 
actually contrary to the protection of voters—as he demonstrated in 
Crawford when arguing that the Court should uphold the voter 
                                                          
 264. Dorf, supra note 14, at 264. 
 265. 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966). 
 266. Dorf, supra note 14, at 267-68. 
 267. Id. at 267. Professor Dorf goes on to consider and reject three possible objections to his 
analysis. First, he explains that the right to vote is not really a First Amendment right in this 
situation, so the Court was not simply applying traditional First Amendment overbreadth analysis. 
Id. Second, he rejects the contention that a plaintiff would have a personal stake in her ability to 
vote without a poll tax even if she could pay it and therefore would not need to bring an overbreadth 
challenge. Id. at 267-68. Finally, Dorf dismisses the argument that because the Court struck down 
the law in its entirety on equal protection grounds, the decision did not establish the validity of 
overbreadth challenges involving fundamental rights per se. Id. at 268. Dorf concludes, “In short, 
Harper can only be explained as an instance of overbreadth analysis outside the narrow context of 
free speech.” Id. 
 268. 517 U.S. 186 (1996). 
 269. Id. at 241-42 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 270. Id.  
 271. Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2683 (2007) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Indeed, any clear rule that would protect all 
genuine issue ads would cover such a substantial number of ads prohibited by § 203 that § 203 
would be rendered substantially overbroad.”). Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas joined Justice 
Scalia in this opinion. See id.  
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identification law in all of its applications.272 Justice Scalia seems to 
have created a presumption in favor of the state and then solidified that 
presumption through facial validation, as opposed to protecting voters 
through facial invalidation. But he is correct that it is important to decide 
these issues before an election so that the rules are clear.273 It follows 
that, notwithstanding the manner in which Justice Scalia has applied this 
rule in election law cases, courts should extend the overbreadth doctrine 
to all laws that affect political participation. This will ensure that states 
cannot continue to infringe upon the right to vote in some situations 
simply because the affected political actor is not before the court, while 
also giving states clear rules before an election on what types of 
regulations are permissible. This approach also mitigates the chilling 
effect of an unconstitutional law. In sum, the Court should be proactive 
in providing a limiting construction or partial invalidation when an 
election law is overbroad so as to ensure protection of the right to vote 
and open the democratic process to all participants.274  
There are sound practical reasons to extend the overbreadth rule to 
the election law setting. As one commentator has noted, 
To assure vindication of not only one’s personal rights but also the 
rights of others whose rights are substantially threatened but whose 
condition or circumstance does not permit their personal challenge, an 
overbreadth doctrine that reaches the contours of all fundamental rights 
is a necessity. . . . Human conditions or circumstances—indigence, 
ignorance, illness, disability, immaturity, old age, imprisonment, 
isolation, timidity, fear, and the like—often prevent a patently 
unconstitutional law from being challenged by one directly affected by 
the law. Third-party standing is the prophylactic that vindicates the 
rights of those not before the court. Simply put, the prophylactic 
minimizes application of enactments that do not measure up to a 
constitutionally valid rule of law but instead impede exercise of 
fundamental rights to a substantial degree.275 
The right to vote certainly qualifies for this treatment. A rule in 
favor of resolving disputes can thus provide the focus for courts to be 
ever vigilant in ensuring that voting remains fair and unencumbered. The 
overbreadth doctrine can help to ensure that election laws do not chill 
                                                          
 272. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1624 (2008) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 273. See id. at 1626; Wis. Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 at 2682 n.5. 
 274. See Morse, 517 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 275. Decker, supra note 45, at 103-04 (footnotes omitted). 
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political participation. Accordingly, the overbreadth approach is a cogent 
substitute for the facial/as-applied distinction in election law cases. 
To invalidate an election regulation, the plaintiff should not have to 
show that the law is unconstitutional in every instance or as applied to 
that specific plaintiff; the plaintiff should only need to show that the law 
is invalid as applied to some political actor, that is, that it is overbroad 
because it reaches a political actor’s constitutionally protected conduct 
in a substantial number of contexts.276 This provides deference to those 
who seek to engage in the political process. It therefore uses a judicial 
rule to shift power away from the entrenched majority and vindicate the 
rights of everyone who participates in self-governance.277 This should be 
so: In a realm in which the right to vote is “preservative of all rights,”278 
we should err on the side of more clear and less onerous election 
regulations. 
Based on the overbreadth doctrine, the Court should sever an 
unconstitutional application of an election law even if those infringed are 
not before the court. Similar to the First Amendment context, a law that 
infringes upon any voters’ rights is, by definition, overbroad.279 
Unfettered political participation is too important to allow 
unconstitutional applications of an election law to go unaddressed. 
Concerns about open political participation and the possibility of chilling 
political expression through voting should outweigh the Court’s typical 
                                                          
 276. In some ways, this is similar to Professor Monaghan’s “valid rule requirement,” in which 
“everyone has a personal right, independent of third-party standing, to challenge the enforcement of 
a constitutionally invalid statute against her.” Henry P. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1, 3; see also Fallon, supra note 14, at 1327; Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error and the 
Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195. 
 277. See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 
2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344476 (discussing the 
idea that courts should employ a canon of construction that favors voters in a election law dispute). 
 278. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). 
 279. Several scholars have advocated for the Court to incorporate some aspect of First 
Amendment jurisprudence into election law. See, e.g., Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, 
Electoral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of Association, 91 CAL. L REV. 1209, 1215, 
1255-62 (2003) (suggesting that the First Amendment should apply to questions of racial identity 
and associational rights); David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First 
Amendment, 36 CAP. L. REV. 1, 46-52 (2007) (suggesting that the Court should shift toward a First 
Amendment analysis for claims of partisan gerrymandering); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive 
Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 330, 334-41 (1993) (promulgating a First Amendment theory for the 
right to vote). Justice Kennedy has also opined that the First Amendment may be relevant in the 
political gerrymandering context. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314-15 (2004) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
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preference, through its as-applied jurisprudence, for constitutional 
avoidance.280 
Of course, a plaintiff who has more concrete facts about how the 
election scheme burdens the right to vote for some political actors will 
be more likely to win. But if the political actor bringing suit shows that 
the state’s election law unconstitutionally burdens the right to vote for 
someone engaged in the democratic process, then it should not matter if 
the law burdens the plaintiff’s rights or someone else’s rights. The rules 
of Article III standing will ensure that the courts are not overreaching in 
analyzing a law, because the plaintiff still must have a personal stake in 
the litigation to bring suit.281 If a plaintiff with standing can show that 
the state is infringing upon the rights of another political actor, then this 
should be enough to invalidate at least the unconstitutional application 
of that election regulation even if the state can validly apply the law to 
the plaintiff who brought suit, much like in a First Amendment 
overbreadth setting.282 
Here is how a challenge to the constitutionality of an election law 
would work without the initial gloss of the facial or as-applied standard: 
Suppose, as in Crawford, several plaintiffs challenge a law requiring a 
voter to show a photo identification to vote. Instead of asking whether 
the plaintiffs are challenging the law on its face or as applied, the court 
will simply determine whether the law—in any application—burdens 
voters’ rights. More specifically, is the law overbroad in regulating the 
right to vote by reaching constitutionally protected activity in a 
substantial number of contexts? Does requiring photo identification 
impermissibly infringe upon the right to vote for any otherwise-eligible 
voters? If the law unconstitutionally burdens the plaintiffs themselves, 
then the court will invalidate the law for at least that application, because 
direct evidence of the infringement is before the court. If the plaintiffs 
cannot present enough evidence to show that the law unconstitutionally 
infringes upon the rights of any political actor, then the court will 
properly reject the plaintiffs’ challenge, at least until the plaintiffs can 
come up with additional evidence.283 But if the plaintiffs—who have 
standing—demonstrate that the photo identification requirement 
                                                          
 280. See Persily & Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 1652-54 (noting that concerns about a chilling 
effect on protected speech reverse the typical presumption of constitutional avoidance). 
 281. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
 282. See Gans, supra note 13, at 1342-43.  
 283. In some ways, the requirement that the plaintiffs come forth with an appropriate amount 
of evidence mimics Chief Justice Roberts’s approach in Washington State Grange. See Wash. State 
Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1196-97 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring). 
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infringes upon the right to vote for another group or in a slightly 
different situation, or if the law chills political participation, then there is 
little benefit for having a procedure-type rule that allows only as-applied 
challenges.284 In that instance, the Court should be willing to strike down 
the unconstitutional applications of the law or at least interpret the 
statute so as to cure the constitutional defect.285 
This approach does not require wholesale invalidation of an 
election law. In a recent case involving abortion rights, the Supreme 
Court recognized that a court need not invalidate an unconstitutional law 
in its entirety if it is possible to sever the invalid portions and stay 
faithful to legislative intent.286 Using the severability doctrine to cure the 
constitutional defect of an election law allows the Court to foster open 
democracy while at the same time protecting the ability of states to 
constitutionally regulate their elections. Of course, if it is not possible or 
would be contrary to legislative intent to sever the invalid portion, then 
the Court must strike down an overbroad election law in its entirety.287 If 
it is possible to sever the unconstitutional provision, however, then 
intertwining the overbreadth and severability doctrines in this way 
provides the most protection for voters without requiring states to re-
write every invalid election regulation. As noted above, another 
approach is to interpret the statute narrowly by excising invalid 
applications so as to cure the constitutional defect. Underlying these 
ideas is the concept that courts should actually decide election law 
disputes and proactively determine when states are infringing upon the 
right to vote instead of upholding the law on its face and waiting for an 
as-applied challenge to invalidate certain applications. 
The reasons for abolishing the facial/as-applied distinction and 
adopting the overbreadth doctrine for election law cases are plentiful. 
First, it streamlines litigation and provides the most protection for the 
right to vote. Obtaining prospective relief before an election is 
particularly important, as the harms that occur if a state is allowed to 
enforce an unconstitutional law during an election are detrimental and 
irreversible: people will be denied their legitimate right to vote and may 
be chilled in exercising the franchise. If voting is “preservative of all 
rights,”288 then it should be paramount that voters are not denied that 
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right, even for a single election. It also promotes the idea that voting is 
one of the most important—indeed, fundamental—rights in our 
democracy.289 
Second, it ensures that unlikely plaintiffs—those who are less likely 
to challenge a law even though they suffer burdens under it—will 
benefit from a ruling that vindicates their rights.290 There are some 
voters who will find that the burdens of challenging a law far outweigh 
the benefits, even though a state’s election practice is infringing their 
rights.291 We should care about those voters’ rights as much as every 
other voters’ rights, especially because a handful of votes can decide an 
election.292 Therefore, as a normative matter, we should want every vote 
to count so as to effectuate the goals of self-governance. Requiring only 
as-applied challenges to election laws makes it less likely that courts will 
protect these voters rights, because courts will refuse to invalidate laws 
that might be unconstitutionally burdening these individuals until 
someone brings an as-applied lawsuit.293 The overbreadth doctrine 
allows courts to vindicate the rights of all potential voters who suffer an 
unconstitutional burden and helps to erase any chilling effect on political 
participation stemming from an onerous election law. 
Third, eradicating the facial/as-applied rule will promote clarity in 
the election process.294 When courts actually decide what types of 
election regulations are permissible and what types are not, 
governmental entities and those in the political process know what to 
expect. For example, by rejecting the facial challenge to Indiana’s voter 
identification law but leaving open the possibility of as-applied 
challenges, the Supreme Court simply invited additional confusion and 
litigation.295 Can a state require an identification for elderly people who 
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have a hard time obtaining one? Can a state mandate a photo 
identification for those who religiously object to having their pictures 
taken? The Court simply left these questions unanswered because it 
construed the plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a facial challenge to the law, even 
though it recognized that there was at least some (albeit, according to the 
controlling opinion, insufficient) record evidence on the burdens that the 
law imposed.296 Perhaps the record was simply not developed enough to 
rule upon these issues, which is one benefit of leaving these questions 
for a specific as-applied challenge.297 But given the possibility of some 
voters suffering a constitutional violation in an upcoming election, 
ruling upon the legality of an election practice whenever practicable 
should outweigh the desire to develop a rich record. Accordingly, if 
there was enough evidence in Crawford of the burdens on certain voters 
(even without a fully developed record), and if the Court had not strictly 
applied the facial/as-applied rule, then it could have ruled upon the 
extent to which Indiana could enforce its photo identification law in 
many of the challenged settings.298 Instead, the Court used the guise of 
requiring as-applied challenges to punt on these issues, sacrificing clarity 
and fostering additional litigation in the process. 
Closely aligned with these justifications for eliminating the 
requirement that plaintiffs bring only as-applied election law challenges 
are the goals of promoting equality and abolishing the stigma associated 
with burdensome election regulations.299 Perhaps the most prominent 
aspect of the right to vote is equality; ensuring that every vote counts 
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equally is the cornerstone of democratic self-governance.300 Allowing a 
state to promulgate election laws that infringe upon that right for some 
people—even for a single election cycle—runs counter to this goal. 
Moreover, there is a societal stigma associated with being turned away 
from the polls because of purported ineligibility.301 It is likely that those 
discouraged during the voting process may choose not to participate in 
the future. In that sense, allowing a state to run its election using a law 
that may be unconstitutional for some people increases the chilling effect 
of the law and enhances that stigma; the right to vote becomes less 
valued for these people, which is an unpalatable result—especially if 
courts are simply waiting for a valid as-applied challenge to the law. 
Consequently, case-by-case adjudication through as-applied challenges 
is too slow to vindicate these rights.302 
The preceding analysis shows that the Court’s pigeonholing of 
election law challenges into as-applied litigation has more than simply 
semantic effects. There are real, practical consequences of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. The method by which a plaintiff can challenge an election 
law affects the likelihood of a court sustaining the government’s 
approach to election regulation. This, in turn, impacts how people 
interact with the political process and gives greater power to those 
already in office to shape the rules of the game. Allowing only as-
applied challenges in essence preserves the status quo, making it more 
difficult to challenge inequities in voting rights. The Court’s approach 
shuts the courthouse door to many political actors who may wish to 
challenge the manner in which we elect our leaders. At its most practical 
level, then, the Court is simply protecting the government’s electoral 
scheme through the guise of allowing only as-applied litigation—all at 
the expense of the vindication of voters’ rights. Washington Stage 
Grange and Crawford demonstrate the Court’s power in defining the 
meaning of the right to vote through procedural-type rules that have the 
effect of favoring the state’s electoral scheme, even if that means that 
some political actors might suffer a violation of their constitutional 
rights in the process. The overbreadth doctrine can help to remedy the 
negative implications stemming from the rule in Washington State 
Grange and Crawford. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
It is still too early to tell if Professor Hasen was entirely correct in 
predicting that the Supreme Court’s rule rejecting facial challenges to 
election laws will cause short-term damage to minority voters,303 but the 
evidence at least preliminarily suggests that the Court’s approach has 
already had an adverse effect on voters’ rights. In Washington State 
Grange and Crawford, the Court pigeonholed election law litigation into 
as-applied challenges, which presents a significant hurdle for those 
seeking to invalidate a law. At a minimum, it requires the political actor 
to provide a complete data set on the actual effects of the law, which, in 
many cases, is impossible to gather unless the electorate endures at least 
one election under that regulation. More significantly, the Court has 
signaled that the balance of power in election law cases rests squarely 
with the states. This will have a disproportionate effect on minority 
voters and minor political parties, who are more likely to suffer burdens 
and challenge a law in the face of an entrenched majority. The Court 
provided an interpretative lens through which courts must now view 
election law challenges. Lower federal courts have taken notice and are 
more likely to uphold a state’s election regulation or at least reject a 
broad constitutional challenge. Although none of the Justices indicated 
that this approach would have a significant impact on election law, the 
Court’s decisions demonstrate its power to narrow the protections it 
provides for the right to vote, thereby impacting the substantive right 
involved. The Justices should be more careful in promulgating what 
seem to be procedural rules, as the decisions have a tremendous effect 
on shaping the political process. This analysis also demonstrates the 
importance of judicial decision-making in defining the meaning of 
political participation and the scope of the right to vote. Finally, at the 
most practical level, this discussion calls into question the propriety of 
the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges in election law 
and suggests that the Court’s approach does more harm than good. 
 
VII. EPILOGUE: NAMUDNO 
Just before this Article went to print, the Supreme Court decided 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One v. Holder 
(“NAMUDNO”),304 a challenge to Section Five of the Voting Rights 
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Act.305 The political subdivision that brought suit, a water district in 
Travis County, Texas, challenged the requirement that it “preclear” any 
changes it made to its election rules with the Department of Justice or 
the D.C. district court.306 The water district alleged both that it should be 
allowed to “bail out” of the preclearance requirement and that 
Congress’s reauthorization of Section 5 in 2006 was unconstitutional.307  
After oral argument, most observers believed that the Court would 
strike down Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act as unconstitutional.308 It 
appeared that at least five Justices would rule that Congress had not 
sufficiently justified its continued imposition of preclearance on covered 
jurisdictions. The commentators assumed that the bailout issue was a 
non-starter because the water district was ineligible for a bailout under 
the plain text of the Voting Rights Act and previous case law construing 
the definition of “political subdivision.”309 Rejecting the water district’s 
bailout argument would require the Court either to uphold or strike down 
the law on its face.310 In short, the expectation was that Court would rule 
conclusively on the law’s constitutionality. 
It surprised many, therefore, when the Court sidestepped the broad 
constitutional question and resolved the case solely on the narrower 
statutory bailout issue.311 The Court stretched the statutory language and 
discounted its prior case law to hold that the definition of “political 
subdivision” in Section 14 of the Voting Rights Act did not apply to the 
bailout provision in Section 4(b).312 The Court thus adopted an extremely 
broad definition of “political subdivision” for purposes of bailout and 
ignored the statutory definition to avoid the constitutional question in the 
case.313  
In light of the as-applied-only rule from Washington State Grange 
and Crawford, however, the Court’s resolution of NAMUDNO is hardly 
remarkable. The Court’s decision is entirely consistent with its recent 
approach to constitutional adjudication in this area, in which it avoids 
making sweeping pronouncements on the constitutionality of an election 
                                                          
 305. 42 U. S. C. § 1973c(a). 
 306. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, No. 08-322, slip op. at 5-6. 
 307. Id. 
 308. See, e.g., Rick Hasen, NAMUDNO: The Answer to My Question Appears to Be “Yes,” 
Election Law Blog, Apr. 30, 2009, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013533.html. 
 309. See, e.g., United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm’rs, 435 U. S. 110, 117-18 (1978). 
 310. See, e.g., Posting of Heather K. Gerken to Balkinization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2009/ 
06/supreme-court-punts-on-section-5.html (June 22, 2009, 10:42 EST). 
 311. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One, slip op. at 10-11. 
 312. Id. at 16. 
 313. Id. 
  
696 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:635 
law, instead preferring case-by-case interpretation. The water district’s 
bailout argument was analogous to an as-applied challenge to Section 5, 
which the Court embraced to avoid analyzing the statute’s facial 
validity. In essence, the Court ruled that Congress could not impose 
Section 5 as applied to the water district or any other political 
subdivision that successfully seeks a bailout. The law remains valid as to 
those who do not obtain a bailout. This conclusion necessarily 
pretermitted the need to rule upon the facial validity of the statute. The 
Court thus proved once again that it prefers to move slowly through 
constitutional issues in election law. 
At first blush, the decision in NAMUDNO seems to fall within the 
previously identified worrisome trend stemming from Washington State 
Grange and Crawford. In recent election law cases, the Court has 
abdicated its role of providing clear guidance on the constitutionality of 
election laws by avoiding broad constitutional questions. This piecemeal 
approach leads to negative consequences for voters and other political 
actors, particularly given the chilling effect of an unconstitutional law 
that stays on the books during an election only because no one has 
brought an as-applied suit. 
But the consequences of avoiding the constitutional issue in 
NAMUDNO are quite different because the law under review does not 
regulate voters or other political actors. The Voting Rights Act burdens 
not voters, candidates, or political parties but states and other covered 
jurisdictions, which promulgate the rules of an election. The typical 
concerns about a chilling effect on political participation are absent for 
Section 5, which targets the rulemakers themselves. There is less 
uneasiness surrounding the constitutional avoidance approach in 
NAMUDNO than there was for the rule stemming from Washington 
State Grange and Crawford, because failing to answer the tough 
constitutional question in NAMUDNO does not lead to the further 
infringement of voters’ or others’ rights. A minor burden on covered 
jurisdictions that do not successfully seek a bailout—having to preclear 
new election rules before implementing them—is wholly unlike the 
chilling effect of an invalid law on voters who have not yet brought a 
post-election as-applied challenge and who simply may decide not to 
participate in an election instead of resorting to litigation. Further, a 
covered jurisdiction will rarely choose not to make an election change 
simply because it must seek preclearance first, especially because the 
Department of Justice will approve a regulation that does not adversely 
impact minority voters. Thus, there is little concern about a chilling 
effect based on the “as-applied” approach in NAMUDNO. 
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The Court had powerful political and institutional incentives to wait 
on ruling upon the constitutionality of Section 5. By fashioning a narrow 
ruling that provided dicta on the constitutional problems with the law but 
resolved the case through statutory construction, the Court avoided 
striking down a bastion of the civil rights movement while at the same 
time providing Congress with a chance to fix the possible constitutional 
defects. This ruling protects minority voters, who benefit from a 
requirement that covered jurisdictions preclear any changes in voting 
practices. Section 5 requires preelection approval of a new election 
regulation to ensure that the change will not adversely affect voters or 
others—the same goals of a rule promoting preelection judicial 
resolution of a challenge to a State’s election practices. Constitutional 
avoidance in NAMUDNO therefore serves the goals of protecting voters 
and opening the political process.  
NAMUDNO affirms the Court’s reluctance to invalidate an election 
law on its face. The consequences of this rule are not as stark for 
challenges to the Voting Rights Act as they are for challenges to state 
election statutes, because constitutional avoidance in NAMUDNO 
preserves federal government regulation of those who promulgate state 
electoral rules. But it does suggest that the Court is being extremely 
careful about ruling upon the constitutionality of a law that affects 
electoral rights. Once again, we see the Court viewing its role as giving 
deference to those who regulate the political process—in this case, 
Congress. The Court’s recent election law decisions demonstrate its 
willingness to preserve the status quo, providing only incremental relief 
to those who challenge an election law. Typically, the Court 
rubberstamps a state’s electoral practice even if it strikes down one 
application, potentially leading to the infringement of voters’ rights until 
those voters bring a post-election as-applied suit. Although the 
constitutional avoidance approach in NAMUDNO was largely the same 
as in Washington State Grange and Crawford, the consequences of 
NAMUDNO are quite different, because the Court’s decision preserved 
Congress’s regulation of those who create and enforce the rules—rules 
that the Court is now more likely to uphold in most settings based on its 
recent as-applied methodology.  
